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EXPLOITATION
John Lawrence Hillt
INTRODUCTION
Consider the following cases:
1) A dance hall studio persuades a desperately lonely and de-
pressed widow to purchase $50,000 in dance lessons by convincing
her that she has a talent for dancing. The payment for the lessons
requires her to sell everything she owns, including her home.'
2) A ticket scalper outside a sold-out Bruce Springsteen con-
cert charges a fan $150 for a ticket that he purchased for $25.
3) A quack physician convinces the distraught father of a dying
son that she can cure the son by an unorthodox method. In desper-
ation, the father pays for the treatment, which is ultimately
ineffective.
4) A pimp first seduces a young girl and then entices her into a
life of prostitution.
5) A poor, uneducated woman enters an agreement to
purchase some household furniture on an installment contract with
a clause granting the seller a cross-collateral security interest in the
furniture. Over a period of years, the buyer purchases $1200 worth
of furniture. With $164 in payment outstanding, she purchases an-
other item and then defaults on the payment for this item. The
seller then repossesses all of the furniture. 2
6) A migrant farm laborer from El Salvador picks oranges at a
rate well below market value, but higher than that paid for similar
work in the laborer's homeland.
7) An educated young woman's daughter is dying of a curable
disease that requires an expensive operation. After exhausting all
alternatives, she becomes the mistress of a lecherous millionaire, in
return for which he will pay for the operation.3
All of these scenarios exemplify situations that might be called
"exploitative" under the common usage of the term. The ambiguous
t Professor of Law, Western State University; J.D. 1988; Ph.D. Philosophy, 1989, Ge-
orgetown University.
1 This example is loosely based on Bal-Fel, Inc. v. Boyd., 503 S.W. 2d 673 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1973) (contract voidable on grounds of common law fraud).
2 These were the facts in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445
(D.C. Cir. 1965) (remanded to determine whether the agreement should be voidable on
grounds of unconscionability).
3 SeeJOEL FEINBERG, Noncoercive Exploitation, in PATERNALISM 201, 208-09 (Rolf Sarto-
rius ed., 1983).
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and ill-defined concept of exploitation has been widely applied, tak-
ing on an open-textured and almost all-encompassing meaning illus-
trated in the seven cases above.
Exploitation is sometimes defined in economic terms.4 Marxist
analyses of exploitation, and those influenced by Marxist critiques of
society, typically emphasize this strand of meaning5 to describe the
relationship between workers and the elite owners of capital or be-
tween the worker and society generally.6 Marxist claims maintain that
workers in the capitalist state are not free to seek adequate compensa-
tion for their labor. 7 The capitalist's profit defines the extent of the
worker's undercompensation. 8 This economic claim is typically com-
bined with a philosophical claim that, in working for another, the
worker is forced to alienate and to objectify his own labor, a process
with devastating psychological consequences. 9 Such Marxist analyses
of exploitation may illuminate cases such as (5) and (6) above.
Other considerations, however, appear more relevant in render-
ing the other cases "exploitative." Cases (2) and (7) result from disad-
vantageous economic conditions, broadly defined, but (2) involves
the voluntary purchase of a scarce luxury. Thus, the exploitative na-
ture of the bargain has little to do with the buyer's status as a member
of the working class. Moreover, case (7) appears to be exploitative not
simply because an expensive medical procedure is difficult to obtain,
4 The contractual analogue for exploitation is the doctrine of unconscionability.
ALAN P. WERTHEIMER, COERCION 40 (1987). Although the doctrine that the law will not
inquire into the adequacy of consideration prevents courts from predicating the uncon-
scionability defense on the substantive terms of the contract, courts have recognized the
economic basis of unconscionability through two conditions. First, a flaw in the market
eliminates reasonable alternatives and, second, the bargaining process itself goes awry.
The second condition apparently includes fraud and gross disparities in the parties' bar-
gaining power. The first condition recognizes flaws in the economic system itself. See gener-
allyJones v. Star Credit Corp., 298 N.Y.S. 2d 264 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969) (holding that the sale
of a freezer for over $1,000, which is valued at $300, to welfare recipients is unconsciona-
ble). For a discussion of the doctrine of unconscionability, see P.S. ATAH, ESSAYS ON
CONTRACT 132-33 (1986); CHARLs FRIED, CONTRACr AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRAC-
TuAL OBLGATION 92-93 (1981) (disparaging unconscionability because even contracts
freely and knowingly entered into may be held unenforceable). But seeJAMES GORDLEY,
THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN CONTRACr DOCTRINE 147 (1991) (indicating that
the doctrine is utilized, "not because a bargain was unequal, but because the harshness of
its terms was evidence of fraud").
5 See, e.g., G.A. Cohen, The Labor Theory of Value and the Concept of Exploitation, 8 PHIL.
& PUB. AFF. 338 (1979); Lawrence Crocker, Marx's Concept of Exploitation, 2 Soc. THEORY
AND PRAc. 201 (1972). See generally ROBERT NozIcK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 253-62
(1974) (providing an overview and response to Marxist theory of exploitation).
6 John E. Roemer, Should Marxists Be Interested in Exploitation?, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
30, 31 (1985).
7 Id. at 30 ("Exploiters are agents who can command with their income more labor
embodied in goods than the labor they performed. . .
8 Id. at 36.
9 Id. at 32.
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but because of the desperation of the mother, the willingness of the
millionaire to take advantage of her situation and because of our as-
sessment of the moral nature of the bargain itself-that is, the wrong-
fulness of alienating one's affection and sexual attractiveness for
money.10
Finally, cases (1) and (3) are even less "economic" in nature. In
case (1), the widow has struck a bad deal. This is not because of an
unfairness in the value of the exchange itself-presumably, unlike
cases (2), (5) and (6), the goods are worth the amount paid-but
because the dance company took advantage of her psychological state
and because she failed to consider the significant cost of the lessons.
Case (3), while obviously unfair because of the doctor's fraud, does
not result from an economic exigency. Rather, the desperate father
of a dying son has been duped into purchasing treatment that, under
normal circumstances, he would probably recognize as ineffective.
Additionally, even to the extent that exploitation is essentially an
economic concept, economic considerations appear to be potentially
exploitative in two very different ways. First, an offer may be exploit-
atively low, as in the instance of the migrant worker in case (6). Ex-
ceedingly bad offers, such as those embodied in boiler-plate
installment contracts similar to case (5) are also characteristic of this
genre of economic exploitation. The contract doctrine of unconscio-
nability recognizes this type of exploitation by providing a defense
under limited circumstances."
Alternatively, exploitative offers may be exploitatively high. This
variant of the term "exploitation" often involves claims of psychologi-
cal compulsion or coercion.' 2 The person may not be reasonably able
to resist the offer, as in scenario (7). If exploitation indeed embraces
both meanings, not only does this indicate an inherent ambiguity in
the concept itself but, equally clearly, exploitation involves something
more than economic considerations as such.'3
10 In this case, exploitation may coincide with commodification. Commodification,
however, is a distinct concept entailing the alienation of some aspect so intrinsic to human
personhood that it should never be sold. See MargaretJ. Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100
HARv. L. Ray. 1849 (1987) (arguing that commodification occurs in alienating, selling or
transferring personal capacities or attributes which are so integral to the sense of self that
they should not be subject to marketability).
11 WERTHEIMER, supra note 4, at 40 (arguing that unconscionability is a form of ex-
ploitation). Compare GoRDLEY, supra note 4, at 147 (supporting unconscionability as a rem-
edy for fraud). See also Arthur A. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New
Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485 (1967) (discussing the origins of unconscionability in the
U.C.G.); S.M. Waddams, Unconscionability in Contracts, 39 MOD. L. REv. 369 (1976) (provid-
ing an overview of the philosophical basis for the unconscionability doctrine).
12 See infra notes 206-18 and accompanying text.
13 Those opposed to surrogate mother arrangements make the seemingly contradic-
tory claim that exploitation can result from offers that are either too low or too attractive.
This suggests definitional ambiguity in the concept of exploitation. Is exploitation the
1994]
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Exploitation may also be analyzed in terms of social and educa-
tional class differences, rather than in terms of economic inequality
per se.14 In this sense, exploitation exists only if there is a significant
disparity in social class between the parties to the agreement.' 5 This
social-domination variant of the term is arguably present in cases (5)
and (6). Although the consequences are economic in both cases, the
domination view of exploitation attributes the underlying evil of ex-
ploitation in the inequalities of social caste and in the disparity in the
distribution of power among different groups in society.16 Most basi-
cally, even if we could ascertain the relative priority of persons of dif-
ferent classes with the requisite facility to determine whether a
particular instance of exploitation was the result of social inequality,
this understanding of the term might exclude situations similar to
cases (1), (2), (3), (4) and, possibly, (7), where the victims of the al-
legedly exploitative arrangements were not socially disadvantaged at
all.' 7
Another view is that exploitation is a function of one's emotional
or psychological state. The lonely widow in case (1) and the dis-
traught father in case (3) are both victims of their emotional circum-
stances: they may have acted under psychological compulsion.' 8 The
young mother in case (7) not only represents the emotional despera-
tion of a parent with a dying child who has no alternative, but she also
must confront her potential sense of guilt if her child were to die be-
cause of her rejection of the millionaire's offer. In contrast, cases (2),
(4), (5) and (6) arguably do not, on their face, involve the same kind
of psychological compulsion although the situation in case (4) is likely
to become coercive at a later point.
result of being under compensated or is it a function of being tempted by attractively large
offers? See infra notes 28-64 and accompanying text.
14 Procedural unconscionability requires a disparity in bargaining power, which may
itself be the result of socioeconomic inequality. One author argues that this requires a flaw
in the bargaining process. ATYAH, supra note 4, at 132-33. Conceptualizing the problem
as lack of consent may not be helpful. See Waddams, supra note 11, at 381-82. Waddams
argues that the problem is one of inequality in bargaining power. Id. at 392. This com-
mentary suggests that socioeconomic inequality underlies the doctrine of
unconscionability.
15 Social class is not defined exclusively in terms of economic power. Education,
political power and other extra-economic factors are also relevant. MAx WEBER, THE THE-
ORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS (A.M. Henderson & Talcott Parsons trans.,
1947).
16 Social domination is an important aspect of the Marxist theory of exploitation.
Roemer, supra note 6, at 31, 38.
17 For the domination doctrine, the question is whether exploitation is relative or
absolute. Does any significant difference in social class suffice, or must the victim fall be-
low a certain socioeconomic level? For example, in the seventh scenario, is there exploita-
tion even if the young woman is a well-educated member of the upper-class?
18 See infra notes 185-205 and accompanying text (discussing external and intra-
psychic coercion).
634 [Vol. 79:631
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Alternatively, exploitation is sometimes equated with other con-
cepts such as enticement, as in the example of the ticket scalper in
case (2);19 seduction, as in the example of the girl in case (4),20 or
commodification, the process by which one alienates one's most es-
sential qualities (e.g., one's love), as in (7) above.21 These variations
appear both over-inclusive and under-inclusive in scope; for example,
one can be seduced without being exploited, and one can be ex-
ploited without being seduced.
Questions fundamental to the moral psychology of human behav-
ior permeate all of these strands of meaning. In some cases, the lan-
guage of compulsion, coercion or involuntariness implies that the
victims of exploitation are somehow not free in acting as they did.22
In others, exploitation raises issues concerning the rationality of the
victim's decision.23 In still other cases, vacillation between the
language of freedom and the language of rationality suggests an un-
certainty based on the underlying ambiguity of the concept of ex-
ploitation.24 These questions of freedom and rationality ultimately
yield to an even more fundamental issue concerning human iden-
tity-whether socially conditioned motives are authentically "our
own." 25 For example, are women frequently victims of exploitation, as
some feminists claim, because their actions, although free in some su-
perficial sense, are ultimately the result of socially imposed values and
beliefs?26
In sum, no clearly defined necessary and sufficient conditions
govern the application of the concept of exploitation. Nor is there an
adequate theoretical basis for understanding exploitation or its excul-
patory function in the law. Yet, exploitation, or one of its legal ana-
logues,27 increasingly forms a basis for social and legal policy
determinations with respect to a wide range of issues.
19 See infra notes 206-18 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 211-12 and accompanying text (discussing seduction).
21 See generally Radin, supra note 10 (discussing commodification).
22 This Article argues that exploitation is an attempt to take advantage of a cognitive
rather than a volitiona impairment. See infra part III.A.5.
23 See infra part III.B (suggesting that exploitation affects the rational process in sub-
tie, but empirically demonstrable, ways).
24 For example, is the primary reason against prisoner research concern about the
involuntary nature of prisoners' decisions? See National Commission for the Protection of
Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Report and Recommendations, Re-
search Involving Prisoners 12 (1976), reprinted in 42 Fed. Reg. 3079 (1977) [hereinafter Na-
tional Commission]. Or is it the prisoners' inability to assess the risks and benefits? This is
the rationale suggested by the regulations ultimately adopted by the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS). 45 C.F.R. § 46.305(a) (2) (1992).
25 See infra part II.
26 See infra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
27 The doctrine of unconscionability differs significantly from the theory of exploita-
tion suggested here. At best, some instances of unconscionability may also be instances of
exploitation.
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This Article proposes a theory of exploitation and applies it to
three areas of current legal controversy: surrogate parenting arrange-
ments, the voluntary sale of organs by living donors, and consensual,
non-therapeutic medical experimentation on prisoners. It argues that
exploitation, although generally over-extended and conflated with a
number of other distinct concepts such as coercion, commodification
and seduction, has a core meaning that warrants legal recognition.
Part I discusses surrogate parenting, organ sales by living donors,
and voluntary experimentation on prisoners, along with claims made
by opponents of each of these practices that they should be prohib-
ited as exploitative. Part II argues that exploitation should operate in
a manner similar to that of excuse in criminal law and related exculpa-
tory defenses in contract and tort law. Part II first analyzes the theo-
retical distinctions underlying excuse, justification and other policy
defenses. Part II next argues that Anglo-American law, following the
Aristotelian tradition, recognizes two kinds of excusing conditions:
those predicated upon compulsion and those resulting from igno-
rance (or, in the language of modem psychology, volitional and cog-
nitive problems, respectively). Part II also develops the proposition
that exploitation does not fit neatly into either the volitional or cogni-
tive category of excuse.
Part III examines in greater depth the underlying theoretical dif-
ficulties with fitting the concept of exploitation into either the para-
digm of compulsion or the paradigm of ignorance. Because the claim
of exploitation typically involves an offer of an additional choice to
the offeree, the situation is arguably not "coercive." Moreover, the
offeree may act with full information; thus, the claim of ignorance
may not apply. Nevertheless, we often feel that the victim should be
relieved of the consequences of a decision made under exploitative
circumstances. Part III first considers various claims that exploitative
offers render the resulting decision involuntary, unfree, or in some
sense a product of psychologically constraining circumstances. Ex-
ploitation is distinguished from coercion using the notions of "intra-
psychic coercion," "intrapsychic compulsion," and exploitation by
social conditioning.
Part III also argues that exploitation is the result of a cognitive,
rather than a volitional, impairment. This section considers empirical
evidence which demonstrates that the cognitive and the volitional as-
pects of human nature are not easily disentangled, and that perturba-
tions on the volitional side (e.g., intense desires) powerfully influence
our cognitive states (e.g., beliefs or perceptions). This section con-
tends that certain offers are exploitative because they take advantage
of the destabilizing influence that these volitional influences have
upon reason.
[Vol. 79:631
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With this theoretical foundation in place, Part IV defines ex-
ploitation. Part IV considers some preliminary questions. For exam-
ple, must the offeror or the offeree be aware of the exploitative nature
of the offer? Does exploitation require that the victim occupy a so-
cially inferior position vis-a-vis the offeror? Must the exploitative offer
always be immoral in some sense in order to be considered exploita-
tive? Then, Part IV outlines the conditions necessary for an offer to
be deemed exploitative. Most essentially, I argue that exploitation is a
psychological, rather than a social or an economic, concept. For an
offer to be exploitative, it must serve to create or to take advantage of
some recognized psychological vulnerability which, in turn, disturbs
the offeree's ability to reason effectively. In the absence of some ad-
verse affect upon the capacity to reason, no offer can reasonably be
deemed "exploitative."
Finally, Part V applies this theory of psychological exploitation to
the three practices discussed at the outset of the piece: surrogate
parenting, voluntary organ sales and consensual experimentation on
prisoners. This Article argues that only the third of these practices
may be generically exploitative.
I
EXPLOITATION IN SURROGATE ARRANGEMENTS, VOLUNTARY
ORGAN SALES, AND CONSENSUAL, NON-
THERAPEUTIC EXPERIMENTATION ON
PRISONERS
In each of the following three areas of controversy, claims of exploita-
tion are often made notwithstanding the fact that each represents a
situation in which the actor has been presented with an additional
alternative: to freely become a surrogate, sell an organ or participate
in a medical experiment. Each case presents the following question:
How can an additional alternative, where the actor is free to pursue
that alternative or to disregard it, ever be exploitative or otherwise
bad? How can giving people an additional choice, vis-a-vis their previ-
ously existing situation, necessitate prohibition? This section exam-
ines the claims that these scenarios are inherently exploitative.
A. Surrogate Parenting Arrangements
Since the first reported surrogate arrangement in 1976,28 surro-
gacy has become increasingly popular. To date, there have been per-
haps four thousand births from surrogate arrangements in the United
28 U.S. CONG., OFF. OF TEcH. AssEssmENT [hereinafter OTA], INFETrr. MEDMCAL
AND SocIAL CHOICEs 36 (1988) (discussing the first modem instance of surrogacy). Of
course, the Old Testament describes two surrogate arrangements. Abraham's wife, Sarai,
had her maid servant, Hagar, conceive a child for Abraham and Sarai. Genesis 16: 2-15
1994] 637
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States. 29 Most of these have been full genetic surrogate parenting ar-
rangements, where the surrogate is the genetic mother of the child, as
opposed to the more expensive form of surrogate arrangement
known as gestational surrogacy, where the intended mother, and not
the surrogate, is the genetic mother.A0
Although a majority of the public favor the legalization of surro-
gate arrangements, 31 others, particularly some feminist scholars, op-
pose surrogacy on a variety of grounds,32 raising various moral and
legal objections.33 Although these objections have diverse theoretical
foundations and types of harms at their crux, they often fall under the
unifying rubric of exploitation.3 4
One of the most frequent bases for the claim of exploitation in
surrogate parenting arrangements is the fear that women may feel
compelled for economic reasons to become surrogates. Poor women
in particular may decide to bear children for others in order to aug-
(Jerusalem Bible). A similar arrangement takes place between Rachel, Jacob and Rachel's
maid servant, Bilhah. Genesis 30:3.
29 Martin Kasindorf, And Baby Makes Four, L.A. TIMES MAG., Jan. 20, 1991, at 10, 13
(citing prominent California attorney's estimate).
30 In both genetic and gestational surrogacy, the surrogate agrees to give the child
she bears to the intended parents. In full (genetic) surrogacy, the surrogate is the genetic
mother. In the much less common partial (gestational) surrogate arrangement, the surro-
gate carries a child from the egg of another woman. JOHN L. HIL, IN DEFENSE OF SURRO-
GATE PARENTING ARRANGEMENTS: AN ETHICAL AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 26 (1989) (published
dissertation, U.M.I. 1990). In full surrogacy, the intended father is usually the genetic
father of the child. Id. at 27. In partial surrogacy, the intended parents are usually the
genetic parents of the child. Id. at 28. Partial surrogacy is more expensive because the egg
is fertilized in vitro, a process which can cost as much as six thousand dollars per ovulation
cycle (not including the surrogate arrangement). OTA, supra note 28, at 141.
For a discussion of the legal and ethical issues involved in surrogate arrangements, see
Hill, supra. See alsoJohn Hill, What Does It Mean To Be A "Parent"? The Claims of Biology as the
Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rxv. 353 (1991) (arguing that intention, rather than
biology, should determine parental rights in collaborative reproductive arrangements).
31 One poll found that 71% of the American public believed surrogate arrangements
should be permitted. Glamour (October 1987).
32 Feminists disagree about surrogacy's morality. Some view it as liberating because it
opens reproductive alternatives to surrogates and infertile women, but others view it as a
form of"reproductive prostitution." Compare Lori B. Andrews, Surrogate Motherhood: Should
the Adoption Model Apply 2, 7 CHILDREN'S LEGAL RTs.J. 13, 18-19 (1986) (setting forth argu-
ments favoring surrogacy) with GENA CoREA, THE MOTHER MACHINE 227-28 (1985) (citing
Andrea Dworkin, who compares surrogacy to prostitution). See generally NormaJ. Wilder,
Society's Response to the New Reproductive Technologies: The Feminist Perspectives, 59 S. CAL. L.
Rxv. 1043 (1986) (discussing the feminist split on these issues).
33 See e.g., George J. Annas, Baby M: Babies (and Justice) for Sale, 17 HASTINGS CENTER
RaP. 13 (1987) (expressing concern regarding baby-selling); Leon R. Kass, "Making Babies"
Revisited, 54 THE PUBLIC INTEREST 32 (1979) (finding that surrogacy has harmful effects
upon children, families and society generally); Herbert T. Krimmel, The Case Against Surro-
gate Parenting, 13 HASTINGS CENTER RaP. 35 (1983) (noting psychological harms to surro-
gate and child); Barbara Katz Rothman, The Meanings of Choice in Reproductive Technology, in
TEST-TUBE WOMEN 23 (Rita Arditti et al. eds., 1984) (suggesting that surrogacy forecloses
women's choices to have children).
34 See infra notes 35-63 and accompanying text.
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ment their family income. For example, in The Mother Machine, Gena
Corea points to instances where women entered into surrogate ar-
rangements under what may have constituted conditions of economic
duress: one involved a penniless 18-year-old widow, and another, the
23-year-old wife of a terminally ill man.35 The danger is obvious: eco-
nomic exigency may force some women to enter surrogate agree-
ments when they might otherwise never have entertained the idea.
Another strand of the exploitation argument involves the fear
that surrogacy may foster an atmosphere that commodifies women
and children-that women will be hired as surrogates for their beauty,
intelligence or race. One commentator portends the rise of a "prod-
uct quality" mentality in the choice of a surrogate,3 6 and another ar-
gues that couples seeking surrogates already evaluate the eye color,
hair color, I.Q. and other physical and intellectual characteristics of
prospective surrogates.37 As part of its report on infertility, the Office
of Technology Assessment suggests that consumers of the new repro-
ductive technologies, such as surrogacy, typically look for the best
"specimen." The report cites an example of two sperm banks that re-
fuse samples from donors who fall below average height or who pos-
sess less than a superior I.Q. and education.3 8 In essence, in contrast
to exploitation as a kind of economic duress, this view holds that sur-
rogacy exploits through instrumental, means-end expectations or
through reduction of the individual to her physical or mental
characteristics.
Another argument gaining currency, particularly among femi-
nists, is the claim that the surrogate is unfree,39 coerced or compelled
in some significant sense.40 This compulsion is not viewed simply as
the function of economic factors, but rather as an inescapable result
of the entire complex of social influences in a patriarchal society that
serve to mold the personality, beliefs, motives, intentions and desires
of women.41 Although a woman may choose to enter into a surrogate
agreement, the argument runs, the decision is only superficially volun-
tary. Because she has grown up in a male-dominated society, which
has conditioned her to view her primary function in that society in
35 CoREA, supra note 32, at 228-29.
36 Shari O'Brien, Commercial Conceptions: A Breeding Ground for Surrogacy, 65 N.C. L.
REv. 127, 146 (1986).
37 CoRA, supra note 32, at 219.
38 OTA, supra note 28, at 228.
39 See generally CoRER, supra note 32, at 166-83 (a woman's choices are unfree insofar
as they are a product of patriarchal society).
40 Id. at 227-28. See also NANCY CHODOROw, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING: Psy-
CHOANALYSIS AN THE SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER (1978) (discussing the social construction of
the maternal image and its effects upon women's reproductive choices).
41 See Mary Ruth Mellown, Recent Development, An Incomplete Picture: The Debate
About Surrogate Motherhood, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 231 (1985).
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largely sexual, procreative and maternal terms, her choices are the
legacy of this socio-psychological framework of social conditioning.42
Corea, for example, argues that women will never truly be free in
the present culture because their very wills are a social construction of
male-dominated society.43 As such, the only freedom left for women
is the freedom to "prostitute oneself."44 Similarly, Martha Field
argues:
Another social interest that might support anti-surrogacy legis-
lation is preventing exploitation-of women, of children, of the
poor.... [T]he exploitative aspects of surrogacy... suggest that
surrogacy contracts may not be sufficiently "voluntary" to deserve
enforcement.45
Additionally, Field claims that "[t]he fear of men and the institutions
they dominate wresting control of childbearing from women is a pow-
erful theme in feminist literature and enforceable surrogacy contracts
could be a giant step toward establishing that control."46 Thus, not
only might the decision to become a surrogate be a product of com-
pelling social forces, but also the advent of commercial surrogacy
might itself contribute to this prevailing, gender-biased social
framework.
The presumably dubious moral nature of the surrogate agree-
ment has also been considered exploitative. Although there are simi-
larities to the argument from commodification, concerns about the
morality of surrogacy do not emphasize the objectification of personal
attributes as such, but focus on the impermissible act of selling a
human substance or capacity, regardless of considerations of its qual-
ity. For example, in discussing surrogate arrangements, one legal
commentator suggests that " [w] hen money animates the transfer of a
human substance, the issue of exploitation arises. " 47 Similarly, an-
other contends that surrogacy is morally more objectionable than the
forced removal of a woman's kidney because of the broken bond be-
tween mother and child:
In my opinion, it is immoral to buy and sell the flesh of a living
human being for profit; to trade organs (or whole humans) as if
they were sugar, coffee, bananas; to act as if living human flesh,
once cornered, slaughtered, or contractually acquired, can, with im-
42 Id.
43 See CoREA, supra note 32, at 21345.
44 Ia. at 227.
45 Martha A. Field, The Case Against Enforcement of Surrogacy Contracts, 8 POL & THE
LinE Sci. 199, 199 (1990); see alsoJohn L. Hill, In Defense of Enforcement of the Surrogate Con-
tract: A Reply To Feld, 9(2) POL & THE LIFE Sci. 253, 257-58 (1991) (responding to claims
that surrogate contracts are inherently exploitative).
46 Field, supra note 45, at 200 (footnote omitted).
47 O'Brien, supra note 36, at 142.
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punity, be turned into soap or lampshades or used for industrial,
scientific, or consumer purposes.
The removal of a child from his birth mother-against her will
and for profit-is even more heinous than the forced removal of a
woman's kidney. A birth mother (her body and her mind) is con-
nected to and remembers her missing baby more vividly than she
remembers her missing kidney.4 8
Here, the importance of maternal-fetal bonding 9 is the basis for the
charge that surrogate arrangements are morally unacceptable.
What appears to be important to this vein of meaning is not sim-
ply the economic disadvantage of the surrogate, nor even the purport-
edly contingent nature of the motives which lead the surrogate to
agree to bear a child for another, but instead a fundamental moral
wrong in allowing such agreements in the first place. If economic and
social considerations were sufficient to render an agreement exploita-
tive, then the same eighteen year old widow who decided to become a
nurse (another traditionally female career choice) would similarly be
a victim of exploitation. Thus, at least some of the claims that surro-
gacy is exploitative appear to be motivated by antecedent convictions
that the activity is, for some other reason, morally wrong, regardless of
economic or social considerations. 50 This explains the frequent com-
parisons of surrogacy to organ selling, baby-selling and prostitution.5 1
The allusion to prostitution is particularly telling.5 2 Both the
prostitute and the surrogate mother are frequently perceived as vic-
tims of exploitation. Both are (usually, in the case of prostitution)
women. Both may have chosen their roles as a response to economic
exigency. And both have chosen roles which require the exercise of
traditionally limiting, feminine functions-sex and procreation. And
yet, in both cases, the subjective psychological experience of the vic-
tims and the objective economic realities of their situations may not
differ significantly from those of women in other, presumably more
acceptable, occupations. At least part of what renders these situations
more "exploitative" than, for example, the case of a similarly situated
48 PHvLus CHESLER, SACRED BOND: THE LEGACY OF BABY M 112 (1988).
49 See generaly Hill, supra note 30, at 894-400 (discussing maternal-infant and infant-
maternal bond and evaluating the claims for their existence and significance).
50 Here the specter of circularity looms large. Opponents of surrogacy, who seek to
demonstrate that surrogacy is morally impermissible because it is exploitative, cannot im-
plicitly assume that it is exploitative because the practice is morally impermissible. See
HiLL, supra note 30, at 126-27.
51 See id. at 123-26 (discussing the comparisons between surrogacy and these other
practices).
52 See CoEAa, supra note 32, at 227; Lars Ericsson, Charges Against Prostitution: An At-
tempt at a Philosophical Assessmen 90 ETmics 335 (1980) (claiming that prostitution is not
inherently exploitative). But see Carole Pateman, Defending Prostitution: Charges Against
Ericsson, 93 ETmIcs 561 (1983) (claiming that prostitution is exploitative).
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woman who decides to take ajob cleaning bathrooms, appears to be
the intuition that surrogacy and prostitution are morally wrong.
As lawmakers across the nation have slowly begun to regulate sur-
rogate arrangements, the concern about exploitation may have led to
decisions to criminalize surrogacy or to hold surrogate contracts un-
enforceable. 53 At least three states have outlawed surrogac 5 4 while a
growing number of other states have passed laws prohibiting the en-
forcement of surrogate contracts. 55 This movement stems in part
from the fear that women who become surrogates are exploited by the
intended parents with whom they contract, by those who facilitate sur-
rogate arrangements for profit, and by society in general. 56
Some courts have also voiced concerns about surrogate exploita-
tion. In the first case to address the enforceability of a surrogate con-
tract, In the Matter of Baby M,57 the New Jersey Supreme Court held
surrogate contracts unenforceable as 'violative of a number of state
statutes and public policies.58 The court elaborated on a number of
the various strands of meaning of the concept of exploitation in hold-
53 Broadly speaking, legislators have three options. At one extreme, they may
criminalize surrogacy, providing for a fine or imprisonment. At the intermediate position,
they may simply refuse to recognize surrogacy, neither sanctioning nor enforcing surrogate
contracts ("legislative nonrecognition"). If the surrogate changes her mind, the court will
assign custody to the intended (genetic) father or to the surrogate as in other child custody
determinations. Finally, legislators may enforce surrogate agreements, even over the ob-
jection of the surrogate mother, making the intended mother the legal mother of the
child, even when there is no genetic connection.
54 MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. § 722.857(2) (West 1993) (surrogacy involving minors,
mentally ill or mentally disabled women is a felony); UTAH CODE ANN. 76-7-204(1) (d)
(1991) (misdemeanor); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.250 (West 1993) (gross misde-
meanor). In a fourth state, surrogacy has been construed to be illegal by the State Attor-
ney General: Op. Atty. Gen. No. 83-162 (Sept. 26, 1983) (surrogacy violates child
trafficking law). Additionally, New York provides a civil penalty for entering surrogate con-
tracts and a felony sanction for subsequent violations. N.Y. DOM. REL. § 123(2) (b) (McKin-
ney 1993).
55 Numerous states have opted for legislative nonrecognition of surrogacy. See, e.g.,
ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-218 (1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-8-2-1 (Bums 1993) (voiding
surrogate contracts entered after March 14, 1988); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(3)
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1988); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9-2713 (West 1991); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 25-21,200 (1991); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 168 B:23(IV) (1992) (providing for judicial
facilitation of surrogacy but permitting rescission); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-05 (1992);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-114(b) (3) (A) (1992).
One state appears to have adopted the enforcement option. Am. CODE ANN. § 9-10-
201 (Michie 1991). Additionally, Virginia has enacted a comprehensive statute forjudicial
recognition of surrogate contracts. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-159 et. seq. (Michie 1993). Third
party involvement for profit, however, is a misdemeanor. Id. at § 20-165(A).
56 This is particularly clear in states, such as Virginia, which make it a crime for third
parties to broker surrogate arrangements while permitting surrogates to enter such con-
tracts. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-165(A) (Michie 1993). A rationale for the distinction is a con-
cern that women may be unfairly induced into such agreements.
57 109 NJ. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988).
58 Id. at 1240-50.
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ing that surrogacy violated state public policy, although the opinion
did not explicitly discuss exploitation.
First, and most generally, the court stated that the "essential evil"
inherent in surrogacy'is the "taking advantage of a woman's circum-
stances," most particularly her need for money, "in order to take away
her child."59 Second, the opinion adverts to the carrot of monetary
enticement and the stick of legal compulsion by holding that the deci-
sion of the surrogate is not truly voluntary:
She never makes a totally voluntary, informed decision, for
quite clearly any decision prior to the baby's birth is, in the most
important sense, uninformed, and any decision after that, com-
pelled by a pre-existing contractual commitment, the threat of a
lawsuit, and the inducement of a $10,000 payment, is less than to-
tally voluntary.60
Additionally, the Court invoked the specter of class differentiation
and social domination:
Intimated, but disputed, is the assertion that surrogacy will be
used for the benefit of the rich at the expense of the poor.... [I]tis
clear to us that it is unlikely that surrogate mothers will be as pro-
portionately numerous among those women in the top twenty per-
cent income bracket as among those in the bottom twenty percent.
Put differently, we doubt that infertile couples in the low-income
bracket will find upper-income surrogates.61
Finally, the transaction is tainted by impermissible motive, the
profit incentive, a mark that evinces the morally questionable quality
of the surrogate arrangement. The court noted that "[i] n the scheme
contemplated by the surrogacy contract in this case, a middle man,
propelled by profit, promotes the sale. Whatever idealism may have
motivated any of the participants, the profit motive predominates,
permeates, and ultimately governs the transaction."62
Ensconced within the same two pages of the opinion, these
passages demonstrate that the many nuances of the concept of ex-
ploitation produce a seemingly powerful response to the claim that
the surrogate's consent is informed, understanding and voluntary.
Thus, claims that surrogate parenting is essentially exploitative draw
upon the varying definitions of exploitation. For some, exploitation is
synonymous with economic duress. For others, it emphasizes the ob-
59 Id. at 1249. But seeJohnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 785 (Cal. 1993) ("Although
common sense suggests that women of lesser means serve as surrogate mothers more often
than do wealthy women, there has been no proof that surrogacy contracts exploit poor
women to any greater degree than economic necessity in general exploits them by induc-
ing them to accept lower-paid or otherwise undesirable employment.").
60 537 A.2d at 1248.
61 Id. at 1249.
62 Id.
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jectification of the surrogate's physical and mental characteristics or
procreative capacity. For still others, it refers to the claim that the
decision to become a surrogate is essentially unfree, a product of the
(male-dominated) social construction of the will of women. Finally,
the charge of exploitation is sometimes simply the result of a pre-ana-
lytic intuition that the practice in question is wrong, and that anyone
who would decide to engage in such activity must be doing so involun-
tarily or as the result of some failure of the rational process. Most
often, however, these views overlap. Financial enticement and eco-
nomic duress, economic duress and social domination, social domina-
tion and commodification, commodification and claims of moral
impermissibility-often, these views undergird and reinforce one an-
other, each another layer in the fabric of the conceptual understand-
ing of exploitation. 63 There appear, however, to be no necessary or
sufficient conditions defining exploitation. In sum, although surro-
gate agreements may be exploitative, it remains unclear exactly what it
is that renders them so.
B. Voluntary Organ Sales
Since the early sixties, organ transplantation has been a viable
medical alternative for those dying of end-stage renal failure and
other conditions.64 Over the past thirty years, with the development
of tissue typing, new surgical techniques, and the immunosuppressive
drug cyclosporine, which combats the body's rejection of transplanted
organs, organ transplant surgery has become increasingly successful. 65
The survival rate for kidney transplants is now ninety percent or
higher in some hospitals. 66 The success of liver, heart, cornea and
other transplants has similarly increased.67
Notwithstanding these successes, however, the supply of available
donor organs falls significantly short of the demand. Each year in the
United States alone, hundreds of people who might be saved if the
necessary organ were available die from conditions of the liver, kid-
63 Others have warned of the potential harm to children and intended parents. The
child born of the arrangement is viewed as a means to the economic ends of the surrogate
and to the psychological ends of the intended parents. Krimmel, supra note 33, at 37. The
intended parents may also be exploited, if the surrogate demands more money under
threat of refusing to relinquish custody. John J. Mandler, Note, Developing a Concept of the
Modem "Family": A Proposed Uniform Surrogate Parenting Ac 73 GEo. Lj. 1283, 1285-87
(1985).
64 Organ Transplants: House Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Investigations an Oversight
of the House Committee on Science and Technology, 98th Cong. 1st Sess. (1983) (testimony of
Thomas E. Starzl).
65 Id. at 74.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 74-75.
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neys or other organs.68 Thousands of others remain on kidney dialysis
awaiting a suitable kidney.69
A number of proposals to meet the shortage of available trans-
plantable organs permit donation, salvaging, or even the posthumous
sale of cadaver organs.70 The most controversial, however, proposes
to create a market in organs from healthy, living donors: live donors
would be permitted to sell organs not required for survival (e.g., one
kidney) for a negotiated price.71 For some years now, there have been
reports of such black market organ sales or offers to sell. From adver-
tisements in South American newspapers offering to sell a kidney or a
cornea, to accounts of wealthy foreign recipients arriving at American
hospitals accompanied by sellers with doctored proof of familial con-
sanguinity, the willingness of some to sell their organs for a large sum
appears almost as great as the need of those seeking an organ.72
Like the surrogate mother who risks the possibility that she may
change her mind and wish to retain custody of the child she bears, the
relinquishment of an organ is not without its risks. At least sixteen
people have died on the operating table in the course of donating
kidneys to relatives.73 Additionally, the donor faces health risks: the
seller may one day need the extra kidney, either because the remain-
ing kidney has failed or because of other health conditions.
Heading the list of objections7 4 to a market in organs from living
donors is the fear of exploitation of the seller.75 First and most para-
mount is the issue of economic duress. As a report by the Council of
68 Only about half of the 10,000 people who await an available kidney each year re-
ceive one. The rest remain on dialysis. Dozens die waiting for an available liver. Id. at 1-2.
69 Id. at 1. The kidney transplant waiting list was 10,000 in 1987, but as many as eight
times that were on dialysis. Lloyd R. Cohen, Increasing the Supply of Transplant Organs: The
irtues of a Futures Marke 58 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1, 4 (1989). Because many on dialysis
know they have little chance of receiving a transplant, the official number of needed kid-
neys is probably artificially low. Id.
70 See Clifton Perry, Human Organs and the Open Market; 91 ETHics 63 (1980) (compar-
ing organ donation, organ salvaging and organ trading with a market in cadaver organs).
See also The Council of the Transplantation Society, Commercialization in Transplantation:
The Problem and Some Guidelines for Practie LANCET 715 (1985) (for a critical discussion of a
market in kidneys from living donors).
71 Dr. H. Barry Jacobs established a company to solicit healthy donors and broker
human kidneys on the open market. Margaret Engel, Va. Doctor Plans Company to Arrange
Sale of Human Kidneys, WASH. Posr, Sept. 19, 1983, at A9. See also Note, Regulating the Sale of
Human Organs, 71 VA. L REv. 1015, 1020-22 (1985) (discussingJacobs' proposal).
72 See The Council of the Transplantation Society, supra note 70, at 716 (recounting
attempts of some citizens of developing nations to sell a kidney or a cornea).
73 Note, supra note 71, at 1033.
74 Other objections include "a dilution of altruism, a less dependable product, the
pricing of a priceless gift, the tendency to view human body parts as commodities that may
lead us to view human beings as things, and the general unsavoriness of a market in body
parts." GeorgeJ. Annas, Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Organ Sales, 14 HASINGS CENTER REP.
22, 23 (1984).
75 Id. at 23.
1994] 645
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
the Transplantation Society maintained, "it seems clear that when pa-
tient care is relegated to the laws of the market place, particularly
when the less privileged can be exploited to improve the health of the
more privileged, all in society are diminished."76 Perhaps more point-
edly, as another author put it:
[S]cientific research and medical education should no longer
be pursued at the physical cost of the economically and socially de-
prived, nor should it exploit the needs of the vulnerable... Equally,
the poor should not be induced by money to offer the material re-
sources of their bodies, and to convert their own health into a salea-
ble commodity in the market place of human replacement parts.77
The fear that developing countries would become the reservoir of
needed body parts for the wealthy in developed nations bolsters the
claim of economic duress.78 Here, the apparently ghoulish nature of
such a market significantly augments the taint of pecuniary motive.
Some commentators have distinguished the sale of blood from
the sale of organs, arguing that the former is morally permissible,
while the latter is not.79 With respect to the sale of blood, "[t]he seller
is not imperiled, the buyer pays a nominal fee, and the commodity
sold is fungible and regenerative."80 Conversely, with the sale of an
organ, "the seller experiences pain and substantial risks, the buyer
may pay a hefty or even an extortionate fee, and the commodity sold is
unique and irreplaceable." 8' In essence, while issues of commodifica-
tion and improper motive support claims of exploitation in the con-
text of organ sales, the themes of social domination and economic
duress are weightier considerations.
In 1984 President Reagan signed into law the National Organ
Transplant Act, a sparsely worded provision that made" it a criminal
offense for anyone to transfer or receive human organs for valuable
consideration. 82 This followed a number of state statutes with the
same effect.8 3 Motivated in large part by concerns that those who
76 The Council of the Transplantation Society, supra note 70, at 716.
77 Bernard M. Dickens, The Control of Living Body Materials, 27 TORONTO L. REv. 142,
166 (1977) (footnote omitted).
78 See Note, supra note 71, at 1020-22 (for a discussion ofJacob's intention to solicit
organs from citizens of developing countries).
79 O'Brien, supra note 36, at 142.
80 Id. (footnote omitted).
81 Id. at 143.
82 42 U.S.C. § 274e (1988). The provision reads in full:
It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly acquire, receive, or
otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable consideration for use in
human transplantation if the transfer affects interstate commerce.
83 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-289.1 (Michie 1992) (passed in response to the Ja-
cobs' proposal but expired July 1, 1993). See also MD. CODE ANN., Health-Gen. § 5-408
(1990) (outlawing organ sales); CAL. PENAL CODE § 367f (West 1992) (same).
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choose to sell an organ are victims of a particularly pernicious form of
exploitation,8 4 the federal act prohibits the sale of organs throughout
the fifty states.85
C. Consensual, Nontherapeutic Medical Experimentation on
Prisoners
The third paradigmatic example of exploitation occurred within
United States prisons. In exchange for participation in medical ex-
perimentation, typically involving drug testing, inmates received cer-
tain privileges ranging from reduced work schedules to additional
conveniences such as color television or higher quality food rations.
In some cases, agreement to participate may have brought favorable
recommendations for parole.86 The experiments themselves were typ-
ically nontherapeutic: they were not intended to benefit the test sub-
jects themselves or even prisoners generally; rather, the beneficiaries
were both the companies seeking to market the products tested and
the commercial consumers of the drugs.87
Medical experimentation increased dramatically during World
War II to test antimalarial drugs necessary to the war effort.88 After
the war, with the expansion of the economy and particularly the drug
industry, prison subjects continued to participate widely in drug test-
ing.8 9 In 1962 the Kefover-Harris amendments to the Food and Drug
Act further encouraged the use of prisoners as subjects in the testing
of drugs.90 By 1969 eighty-five percent of all new drugs were tested on
prisoners in forty-two prisons throughout the United States.91
By the 1970s, however, the mood of policymakers had changed
considerably. Perhaps as a result of the popular association of experi-
mentation on prisoners with the atrocities perpetrated by the Nazis
and the equally troubling, although less far-reaching, legacy of the
Tuskegee syphillis experiments on a number of Southern blacks in
84 The possibility that the sellers might be the poor of developing nations greatly
exacerbates moral issues raised by a market in human organs. H. REP. No. 575, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1983).
85 While the federal statute is limited in scope by the phrase "if the transfer affects
interstate commerce," even intrastate transactions will be considered to meet this test
under the Commerce Clause cases. See Note, supra note 71, at 1025 (providing an overview
of Commerce Clause jurisprudence affecting such transactions).
86 See Kathleen Schroeder, Note, A Recommendation to the FDA ConcerningDrug Research
on Prisoners, 56 S. CAI- L. Rav. 969, 970-72 (1983) (reviewing the history of prisoner involve-
ment in drug testing).
87 This is evinced by the fact that pharmaceutical companies utilized prison experi-
mentation to test products they wished to market to the general public. Id. at 971.
88 Id. at 971.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id. See Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (codified in 21
U.S.C).
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our own country,92 the propriety of medical experimentation on pris-
oners began to be questioned seriously.93
In 1977 the Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of
Biomedical and Behavioral Research, which was established by Con-
gress to make recommendations on issues involving biomedical re-
search, reported on experiments involving prisoners.94 The
Commission maintained that "although prisoners who participate in
research affirm that they do so freely, the conditions of social and
economic deprivation in which they live compromise their free-
dom."95 The Commission strongly discouraged all nontherapeutic
medical experimentation on prisoners. 96 Its rationale was that prison-
ers are subject to coercion by virtue of the circumstances of their envi-
ronment.97 "[W]hen persons seem regularly to engage in activities
which, were they stronger or in better circumstances, they would
avoid, [the principle of respect for persons] dictates that they be
protected."98
Following these recommendations, what is now the Department
of Health and Human Services delegated to the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration (FDA) the power to promulgate regulations that effec-
tively prohibit all nontherapeutic drug-testing on prisoners. 99
Additionally, an institutional review board must approve all proposals
for other research involving prisoners.100 All projects must conform
to a number of criteria designed to ensure that prisoner-subjects are
not unduly influenced to participate. 1 1 These conditions include the
requirement that the inducement not be of such a magnitude that the
prisoner is unable to weigh adequately the risks and benefits of partic-
ipation,10 2 that the risks must be similar to those undertaken by non-
92 In the "Tuskegee experiments," rural African Americans suffering from syphilis
were untreated by researchers who sought to observe the effects of full-blown syphilis.
GEORGEJ. ANNAS ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT To HuMAN EXPERIMENTATION: THE SUBJECT's
DILEMMA 259-60 (1977).
93 See Schroeder, supra note 86, at 971 n.19.
94 National Commission, supra note 24.
95 Id. at 3078.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id. Professor Patricia King of Georgetown University, a member of the Commis-
sion, continues to be a strong opponent of research on prisoners, maintaining that the
prison environment is inherently coercive. Roy Branson, Prison Research, National Committee
Says 'No, Unless... , 7 HASTINGs CENTER REP. 15, 17 (1977).
99 45 C.F.R. § 46.101 et. seq (1993).
100 Id. at 46.103(b) and 46.109(a).
101 Id. at 46.305.
102 Id. § 46.305 (a) (2) (requiring researchers to guard against disproportionate bene-
fits). The report added that:
Any possible advantages accruing to the prisoner through his or her
participation in the research, when compared to the general living condi-
tions, medical care, quality of food, amenities and opportunity for earnings
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prisoner subjects, 03 and that the prisoners must be aware that
participation will have no effect on their prospects for parole. 0 4
Notwithstanding the determination of the National Commission
or the effect of the subsequent regulations, evidence suggests that
prisoners' decisions were in fact informed, understanding and volun-
tary.105 Indeed, some prisoners themselves brought an action after
the FDA ban, challenging its constitutionality and demanding rein-
statement of such testing. 06
There are a number of apparent similarities among the three
practices discussed here. Prisoners, like prospective surrogate
mothers and potential organ sellers, may be seen as a disadvantaged
class. While gender bias and economic exigency may characterize the
situation of the typical surrogate, economic motives undoubtedly ani-
mate the desire to sell a kidney or a cornea, and the obvious limita-
tions of their restricted freedom disadvantage prisoners. Moreover,
all three practices involve the sale of some bodily capacity (e.g., repro-
ductive capacity), or body part (e.g., a kidney or cornea) or one's body
as a whole (e.g., its use for experimental drug testing). Although
there are definite benefits from all three practices, each is accompa-
nied by some claim of a moral taint-the economic motive or the un-
savoriness of the transaction itself. It is easy to see why exploitation, as
it is colloquially understood, arises in each case.
Apart from the social reasons for prohibiting these practices, the
predominant rationale for finding exploitation (or one of its prox-
ies-coercion, duress, or enticement) focuses on the presumably falli-
ble decision of the individual subject. The claim of exploitation
either implicitly assumes or explicitly declares that the practice must
be condemned on the ground that true and voluntary consent of the
subject has not been-and perhaps cannot be-obtained. If these sce-
narios do involve instances of behavior which are, on some level, in-
in the prison, are not of such a magnitude that his or her ability to weigh
the risks of the research against the value of such advantages in the limited
choice environment of the prison is impaired.
I. The regulation uses the language of flawed rationality-that the opportunity for partic-
ipation in prison experiments may pose such intense enticement relative to prison condi-
tions that the prisoner's capacity to weigh the benefits against the harms is impaired.
103 Id. at 46.305 (a) (3) (requiring that the "risks involved in the research are commen-
surate with risks that would be accepted by nonprisoner volunteers"). This appears to be a
substantive decision-oriented test for rationality- if a nonprisoner would not take the risk,
the prisoner's decision might be irrational.
104 Id. at 46.305(a) (6). Again, favorable parole consideration might pose too great an
enticement, thereby overwhelming the prisoner's rational capacity.
105 See Schroeder, supra note 86, at 972-78.
106 See Fante v. Dept. of Health and Human Serv., No. 80-72778 (E.D. Mich. 1980). But
see Bailey v. Lally, 481 F. Supp. 203 (D. Md. 1979) (prisoners alleging that participation in
testing was coerced by excessive inducements).
1994]
CORNELL LAW REViEW
voluntary or unfree, then a comprehensive theory must explain why
such decisions are not voluntary.
The following section examines the inadequacy of the traditional
legal paradigm for human decision-making to account for this excul-
patory dimension of exploitation.
II
THE TRADITIONAL MORAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL PARADIGM
The charge of exploitation is made in two varying ways, function-
ing differently depending on context. In some cases, exploitation is
raised as an affirmative defense to a particular bargain or contract.
The proponent thereby claims that the terms of the bargain are unfair
and should be ameliorated. Here exploitation functions as an excuse,
a defense to a particular bargain predicated upon the allegedly irra-
tional or involuntary nature of the victim's decision. In other cases,
exploitation is raised as a general argument against a broad class of
practices; for example, all surrogate arrangements should be prohib-
ited because surrogacy is an inherently exploitative arrangement. In
this context, exploitation functions not as a defense to a particular
bargain, but as a policy argument marshalled in opposition to the
practice sui generis. Even in this context, however, exploitation oper-
ates as an excuse by declaring that parties to such agreements act, in
some sense, involuntarily or irrationally. Consequently, this Article is
primarily concerned with exploitation as a policy argument raised in
opposition to broad classes of activities. Nevertheless, it will be impor-
tant to understand the exculpatory nature of exploitation.
A. Exploitation as An Excuse
In various areas of the law there are two broad genres of affirma-
tive defenses, 10 7 "external policy defenses" and "internal exculpatory
defenses," respectively.' 08 External policy defenses provide some gen-
eral social reason for permitting a defense. Strictly speaking, the ex-
ternal policy defense does not morally excuse or justify a civil or
criminal defendant for her behavior; rather, it provides a defense in-
dependent of the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct. Internal
exculpatory defenses, on the other hand, serve to exonerate the de-
fendant because of some extenuating aspect of the defendant's situa-
tion: the circumstances of the defendant's conduct serve either to
107 The affirmative defense assumes all facts in the complaint to be true, but relies
upon some substantive limitation of the cause of action in a civil case, or the prosecution in
a criminal case. BLACK'S LAw DIrTioNARY 60 (6th ed. 1990).
108 See Michael S. Moore, Causation and theExcuses, 73 CAnL. L. REv. 1091, 1095 (1985)
(employing a similar distinction).
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negate the wrongfulness of the conduct, thereby justifying it, or to ex-
cuse the conduct by virtue of the actor's mental state. 109
For example, a variety of immunities in tort law serve as an exter-
nal policy defense to conduct that is wrongful and for which, in other
circumstances, the defendant would be liable." 0 The immunity of
legislators for defamatory statements made on the floor of the cham-
ber is one example of this."' The social policy of valuing a free and
open forum for legislative debate justifies this broad immunity. Exter-
nal social policy grounds also underlie immunities based on the status
of the defendant, such as governmental, interspousal or parental im-
munities." 2 Similarly, in contract law, the statute of frauds acts as an
external policy defense. The social policies of preventing perjury,
promoting certainty of the contractual terms, and underscoring the
seriousness of the contract, among others, justify non-enforcement
even when an oral contract may have existed." 3 The illegality of a
contract functions similarly to void all constraints which violate public
policy." 4 Finally, in criminal law, external policy defenses include the
statute of limitations, grants of prosecutorial immunity, and various
procedural and evidentiary defenses for the violation of a criminal de-
fendant's constitutional rights." 5 External policy defenses do not rep-
resent absolution for the moral wrongfulness of an act, they merely
provide a legal defense based on certain social policies.
In contrast, the internal exculpatory defenses serve to negate or
ameliorate the moral taint of the act. They can operate either as a
justification or as an excuse. In criminal law, for example, self-defense
109 See Kent Greenawalt, Distinguishing Justyfication from Excuses, 49 Lw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 89, 91 (1986). The Model Penal Code is more skeptical concerning the prospect of
differentiating between justification and excuse. MODEL PENAL CODE, art. 3, intro. (1985).
110 See W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 1032-75 (5th ed. 1984) (dis-
cussing immunities generally).
111 See, e.g., Methodist Fed'n for Social Action v. Eastland, 141 F. Supp. 729 (D.D.C.
1956) (effect of immunity). The legislators' immunity from defamation suits for state-
ments made during the course of legislative proceedings is often construed as an absolute
privilege. KEETON, supra note 110, at 820.
112 KEETON, supra note 110, at 1032-75. The historical basis for the interspousal immu-
nity was the presumed unity of husband and wife. The public policy of minimal intrusion
in domestic disputes also supported interspousal and parental immunities. See id. at 901-
07.
113 JoHN D. CALAMARI &JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CoiNTACrs 775 (3d ed. 1987).
114 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 178 (1981). The term embraces all bar-
gains which are against public policy.
115 See STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 417-22 (2d ed. 1984)
(discussing prosecutorial immunity). Fourth Amendment rights against unlawful search
and seizure are the paradigmatic example of external policy defenses. See Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) ("searches conducted outside the judicial process, without
prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.").
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functions as ajustification. 116 Even though harming another is gener-
ally condemned, the defendant may be justified when the defendant is
the victim of an unprovoked attack.117 The justification claims, in es-
sence, that the act of harming another was not morally wrong in this
instance. In tort law, the privileges of necessity, recapture of chattels,
self-defense, and defense of others similarlyjustify conduct that would
otherwise be tortious. 118
The second type of internal exculpatory defense is the excuse. 119
Unlike justification, excuses operate by providing a defense because
of the subjective psychological conditions under which the defendant
acted. In criminal law, for example, the insanity defense acts as
an excuse,' 20 as do involuntary intoxication, 121 diminished capa-
city122 and a variety of similar excuses. 123 Although justifiably harm-
ing another is not considered morally wrong, harming another for an
excusable reason is still wrongful-the actor is just not held accounta-
116 See, e.g., United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
117 Id. at 1224 (but to be justified, there must be no other plausible alternative).
118 See KEErON, supra note 110, at 109 (defenses to intentional torts, today called "privi-
leges," are "applied to any circumstance justifying... a prima facie tort, such as battery,
assault or trespass...").
119 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE, art. 3, intro. (1985).
To say that someone's conduct is 'justified' ordinarily connotes that
the conduct is thought to be right, or at least not undesirable; to say that
someone's conduct is 'excused' ordinarily connotes that the conduct is
thought to be undesirable but that for some reason the actor is not to be
blamed for it.
Id.
120 A full overview of the insanity defense is beyond the scope of this Article. Daniel
M'Naghten's case provided the first formulation of the insanity defense in Anglo-Ameri-
can law. 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H. L. 1843) (permitting the defense where, due to mental
disease or defect, the defendant does not understand the nature and quality of the act, or
does not know that the act is wrong). Parsons v. State added the "irresistible impulse" test.
2 So. 864 (Ala. 1887). While the M'Naghten test covered cognitive flaws, the Parsons test
embraced situations in which the defendant could not help doing what he did, a volitional
flaw. The broadest formulation of the insanity defense was the Durham rule. Durham v.
United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). The Durham court excused criminal acts that
were the "product of mental disease or defect." Id. at 875. This was overruled in 1972 with
the author of the Durham opinion concurring. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969
(D.C. Cir. 1972). Brawner adopted the "substantial factor" test, permitting the defense
when mental illness or defect was a "substantial factor" in the commission of the crime. Id.
at 991. For an excellent philosophical critique of the insanity defense, see Joel Feinberg,
What Is So Special About Mental llness?, in DOING AND DESERVING 272-92 (Joel Feinberg ed.,
1970).
121 Voluntary intoxication is no defense to a general intent crime. United States v.
Meeker, 527 F.2d 12 (9th Cir. 1975) (assault). Compare State v. Kramer, 114 N.W.2d 88
(Minn. 1962) (involuntary intoxication is a defense) with Burrows v. State, 297 P. 1029
(Ariz. 1931) (coerced intoxication is a defense).
122 See, e.g., State v. McVey, 376 N.W.2d 585 (Iowa 1985) (diminished capacity).
123 See, e.g., WAvN R. LAFAvE, MODERN CRIMINAL LAw 514-26 (2d ed. 1988) (discussion
of duress as an excuse).
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ble for the act. The action is not considered wrongful in the sense
that it is not blameworthy.
In contract law, the defenses of incapacity, infancy, duress and
unconscionability operate as excuses, based either upon the incapac-
ity of the individual or the coercive circumstances under which the
contract was made.124 Excuses such as these render a contract void-
able;, on the other hand, external policy defenses, such as illegality,
which render the contract void ab initio.125 Thus, with an excuse such
as incapacity, the contract may be avoided only by the party who pos-
sesses the excuse. 126 There are no excuses as such in tort law; rather,
the same result is achieved by adjusting the standard of care in the
plaintiff's prima facie case to account for the exigencies of the defen-
dant's situation.127
The lines between external policy defenses, justifications and ex-
cuses are not always clear. For example, in tort law, persons who act
reasonably but mistakenly in self-defense are not really justified in do-
ing what they have done: the act committed is still wrong. Thus,
while self-defense usually acts as a justification, reasonably mistaken
self-defense appears to operate more like an external policy defense.
Society has put such a high priority on the right to defend oneself that
doing so will be permitted even in cases of reasonable mistake. 12
Similarly, the line between justification and excuse is sometimes
fuzzy. For example, self-defense is generally considered socially desir-
able, thereby rendering its use a form ofjustification. In some cases,
however, the rationale that self-defense is a natural act of self-preserva-
tion-i.e., that the defendant could not help but act as he did-trans-
124 See CALAp..I & P~mu.o, supra note 113, at 306-23 (infancy); id. at 324-31 (incapac-
ity) and id. at 336-50 (duress). Unconscionability may not necessarily fall into either of
these categories.
125 Id. at 324.
126 Courts will leave parties to illegal contracts as they find them, refusing to enforce
an illegal contract. Id. at 888. "Although there is older authority to the effect that the
contracts and executed transactions of the mentally infirm are void, the overwhelming
weight of modern authority is to the effect that they are merely voidable." Id. at 324.
127 See, e.g., Roberts v. Louisiana, 396 So.2d 566 (La. App. 1981) (visual handicap ac-
counted for in adjusting defendant's standard of care). Similarly, the "emergency" doc-
trine permits a jury instruction to the effect that a person confronted with an emergency
must act as a reasonable prudent person in an emergency. The classic case is Cordas v.
Peerless Transp. Co., 27 N.Y.S.2d 198 (1941) (defendent cab driver jumps out of moving
cab to avoid gunman).
128 Adding to the confusion, the Model Penal Code treats reasonable mistake in self-
defense as a choice between justification and excuse. The actor is excused, by this ration-
ale, because the mistake was reasonable. MODEL PENAL CODE, art. 3, intro. (1985). If the
law seeks to encourage or, at least, condone reasonably mistaken actions taken in self-
defense, then the proper categorization should be justification. This confusion illustrates
the ambiguity in the use of the term "excuse."
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forms the defense into a kind of excuse. 12 9 Again, it is the underlying
exculpatory rationale that determines the characterization of the
defense.130
Finally, the distinction between an excuse and an external policy
defense is tested in situations where it is unclear whether the exculpa-
tory policy has more to do with general social considerations or with
the extenuating circumstances of the actor. For example, the contract
defense of misrepresentation can be characterized either from the
standpoint of the wronged party as an excuse-the victim of fraud is
excused from the contract because of the lack of full or accurate infor-
mation-or as an external policy defense from the standpoint of the
wrongdoer-the person who has obtained a contract by fraud or mis-
representation will not be permitted to enforce it.131
To the extent that exploitation is legally recognized, this Article
argues that it should operate as a type of excuse. While there may be
external policy reasons for barring the activities discussed here-that
surrogacy may constitute baby-selling, which is illegal in every state, or
that organ sales result in a social mentality which believes that any-
thing can be bought-exploitation does not function as an external
policy defense. The exculpatory nature of exploitation has to do with
its effect upon the subjective ability of the party to reason and to act
freely and voluntarily.
Thus, while there are many kinds of contracts that are unenforce-
able because of compelling social policy reasons which have little or
nothing to do with the subjective rationality and voluntariness of the
parties,1 32 exploitation operates differently. Insofar as the theoretical
basis for the charge of exploitation concerns notions of involuntari-
ness, coercion, or the inability of the party to rationally weigh her al-
ternatives, exploitation functions as an internal exculpatory defense.
Thus, there is a distinction between contracts that are void and unen-
forceable due to paternalistic policy defenses and those that are voida-
ble due to exploitation. 33
129 Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 COLuM. L. Rxv.
199, 235-36 (1982) (for a consideration of whether such cases represent examples of ex-
cuse or justification).
130 See id. (discussing reasonably mistaken necessity and self-defense as excuses).
131 See, e.g., Earl v. Sales & Co., 226 P.2d 340 (Cal. 1951) (analysis of fraud as exculpa-
tory defense).
132 For example, bargains not enforceable under the Statute of Frauds.
133 See Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contrats, 92 YALE LJ. 763
(1983) (discussing three paternalistic justifications for prohibiting certain forms of con-
tracts). The law might void a contract on paternalistic grounds even though the parties
entered the contract voluntarily. For example, the proscription against the enforceability
of contracts to marry is not predicated upon the claim of coerced or uninformed consent.
Rather, the law refuses to enforce such agreements out of concern for personal freedom
and integrity. Id. at 776.
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A similar distinction must be made between exploitation and jus-
tification: the conduct of the exploited party is not necessarily mor-
ally condoned. Prospective surrogate mothers or sellers of kidneys
may be protected as victims, but their behavior is not necessarily justi-
fled. When the law excuses on the basis of exploitation, it is not be-
cause the conduct of the victim was justifiable, as in self-defense, but
because the exploitative nature of the offer has adversely affected the
decision of the victim.
Why does the classification of the defense matter at all? If the
primary rationale for the charge of exploitation is that there is some
kind of interference with the process of decision-making, then ex-
ploitation should be permitted to prohibit an activity only when such
interference can be demonstrated. The defense of exploitation
should function in a manner similar to the insanity defense, the de-
fense of diminished capacity, and duress, which require an individual-
ized determination of the actor's psychological state.1 3 4 It should not
become a general, paternalistic presumption that all cases of a certain
category are exploitative.13 5
B. The Traditional Paradigm: A Theory of Excuse
The intellectual roots of the traditional moral-psychological 36
paradigm underlying the theory of excuse in Anglo-American law can
be traced to Aristotle. 37 Aristotle argued that acts are involuntary,
and therefore excusable, when they are performed either "under
compulsion or owing to ignorance."' 38 In their various latter-day
manifestations, compulsion and ignorance serve as the two underlying
theoretical foundations for virtually all forms of legal excuse in con-
temporary law. Each exculpatory condition affects a different aspect
of human personality necessary to decision-making. Compulsion af-
fects the ability to freely choose and to act voluntarily (human will),
134 See sources cited supra note 120 for a discussion.
135 Those who adopt a "social dominance" view of exploitation, see supra notes 6, 14-16
and accompanying text, tend to merge these two categories. If exploitation is a function of
socially disapproved uses of one party's socioeconomic status vis-a-vis another party, then
there may be yet another theoretical basis for prohibiting such agreements on paternalistic
grounds.
It is possible, of course, to (paternalistically) presume that all who enter certain agree-
ments have acted involuntarily. This is the likely approach of opponents of surrogacy,
organ sales, and consensual experimentation on prisoners who attack such practices sui
generis. Proving that such a presumption is justified, however, is another matter.
136 The term "moral psychology" denotes questions at the nexus of psychology and
moral theory. When does a person act freely? What does it mean to act involuntarily? And
what does it mean to be compelled against one's will?
137 An important part of this discussion takes place in the Nicomachean Ethics. Aius-
TOT=E, Ethica Nicomachea, in THE BAsic WoRKS OF AmSToTE 964 (Richard McKeon ed. &
W.D. Ross trans., 1941) (bk. III).
138 Id.
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while ignorance affects the capacity to know what to do (human
reason).
According to Aristotle, compulsion occurs when "the moving
principle is outside, being a principle in which nothing is contributed
by the person who is acting or is feeling the passion." 139 According to
this model of behavior, the excused actor must be motivated by cir-
cumstances and conditions external to the self. Various terms approx-
imate this notion of external motivation, including compulsion,
coercion and durress.
The second general exculpatory condition occurs when an act is
performed by reason of ignorance. Essentially, a person cannot be
considered to have acted "voluntarily"140 with respect to a particular
set of circumstances if the person was ignorant of some important as-
pect of those circumstances. Aristotle distinguished acting by reason
of ignorance, which is excusable, from acting in ignorance, which is
not pardonable.141 For example, a drunk acts in ignorance, not by
reason of ignorance, and so is not excused for his conduct.142 Actors
may be ignorant with respect to who they are, what they are doing,
upon what or whom they are acting, what the instrumentality of their
action is, how they are actually performing the action, or to what end
they are striving.' 43 Aristotle argued that in these instances the act is
not voluntary, and so is excusable.
In large part, Anglo-American common law has incorporated this
dichotomy between the volitional and the cognitive aspects of a theory
of exculpation. In criminal law, the dichotomy between compulsion
and ignorance emerges in a variety of defenses. For example, compul-
sion is the basis for the defense of duress.'" Additionally, a person
may use the defense of not "acting" at all, as in the case of uncon-
sciousness. 145 Partial defenses to specific intent crimes, such as provo-
139 Id.
140 The modem philosophical and legal definition of voluntariness requires a mental
state and a corresponding bodily act. One voluntarily fires a gun, but one intentionally
shoots at a particular target. See KEEToN, supra note 110, at 33-37 (distinguishing voluntary
and intentional acts). Translations of Aristotle use the word "voluntary" as the law uses the
term "intentional." See, e.g., AlsromE, supra note 137, at 966-67 (discussion of ignorance).
He maintains that one has not acted voluntarily when one is ignorant of certain features of
an action related to its consequences. Under the modem legal lexicon, this is uninten-
tional action.
141 AlusromtE, supra note 137, at 966.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 See LAFAvE, supra note 123, at 419 (discussing duress as a defense to criminal
prosecution).
145 Unconsciousness negates the mens rea required for a crime. See, e.g., State v. Cad-
dell, 215 S.E.2d 348, 360-63 (N.C.1975) (discussing unconsciousness, also referred to as
automatism, as a complete defense to a criminal charge). The moving principle behind an
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cation 146 or diminished capacity,147 are a result of the intuitive notion
that a person may be partially overcome by emotion or by other condi-
tions surrounding the act.
It should be noted that Aristotle would have dismissed the in-
creasingly popular notion of internal compulsion as a self-contradic-
tory concept. 148  Similarly, an Aristotelian scheme would not
encompass the irresistible impulse version of the insanity defense. 149
In both cases, because the moving condition arguably arises from
within the person, a true Aristotelian scheme would permit no such
defense. More recently, however, philosophers have found that defin-
ing what is "outside" and what is "inside" a person, metaphysically or
psychologically, is a particularly intractable problem. 50
The paradigm instance of compulsion is found in cases of duress.
In contract and tort law, coercion provides the legal basis for relieving
a party of liability. Contract law generally excuses a party from a con-
tract obtained under duress, although it limits the scope of duress. 1 1
Tort law recognizes various degrees of involuntariness, but treats it
more subtly. Thus, the person who acts under constraining circum-
stances may be held to a lower standard of care for negligence, as in
the doctrine of emergency.' 52 The rationale for the lower standard is
that, in the interest of self-preservation or some equally irresistible
condition, the person could not help but act in that way. 153
Ignorance as a defense is considerably more problematic, but it
continues to represent the second general exculpatory condition in
certain areas of the law. Although in criminal law it is generally recog-
unconscious act is "external" to the actor in the sense that it does not arise from the con-
scious self.
146 See People v. Washington, 130 Cal. Rptr. 96, 99 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (applying the
"reasonable man" test to the defendant's "heat of passion" defense, which reduces second
degree murder to voluntary manslaughter if successful).
147 See State v. McVey, 376 N.W.2d 585, 588 (Iowa 1985) (holding that the diminished
capacity defense is available only for specific intent crimes).
148 See infra part III (discussing intrapsychic coercion and intrapsychic compulsion).
For Aristotle, compulsion must come from without rather than from "within" the individ-
ual. AusToTLE, supra note 137, at 964.
149 See AlusToE, supra note 137, at 964. The irresistible impulse test applies when a
person cannot resist performing a particular act due to internal psychological processes.
Parsons v. State, 2 So. 854, 863 (Ala. 1887).
150 See Meir Dan-Cohen, Responsibility and the Boundaries of the Self, 105 HAaV. L. Ray.
959 (1992) (investigating the problem of ascribing responsibility).
151 The test for duress in contract law is whether the wrongful act or threat overcomes
the free will of a party. Kaplan v. Kaplan, 182 N.E.2d 706, 709 (Ill. 1962). The question, of
course, is: what is required to overcome free will? The test is objective-whether the co-
erced party had a reasonable third alternative. CALAMAm & PERmLLo, supra note 113, at
337.
152 Cordas v. Peerless Trans. Co., 27 N.Y.S.2d 198 (1941) (no liability for cab company
after cab driver exits moving cab in response to a gun at his head).
153 Id.
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nized that ignorance of the law is no excuse,154 ignorance of law may
occasionally constitute a defense, particularly where the offense statu-
torily requires proof that the defendant knew that the act was ille-
gal.155 In other cases, ignorance of fact may also provide a defense to
general intent crimes156 or may serve to negate the requisite mental
element in specific intent crimes.' 57 For example, the M'Naghten 58
version of the insanity defense excuses defendants who either do not
understand what they are doing or do not understand that the act is
morally wrong.' 59 Thus, the M'Naghten test encompasses ignorance of
both as the nature and the moral permissibility of the act.
Because of the growing emphasis on objective rather than subjec-
tive standards of conduct, 60 tort and contract law increasingly pre-
sume that parties possess certain kinds of knowledge. 161 Thus,
ignorance will be no excuse. Misrepresentation, mistake, incapacity
and infancy, however, continue to be grounds for barring the enforce-
ment of a contract 162 on the theory that the actor was either acting in
the justifiable absence of full information or was intellectually incapa-
ble of reasoning.163 Although tort law often presumes knowledge on
the part of plaintiffs and defendants, 64 ignorance of one's circum-
stances may serve to reduce the level of intent (for example, from
154 LAFAVE, supra note 123, at 164.
155 See, e.g., Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 425 (1985) (concluding that a
conviction under a foodstamp fraud statute requires proof that the defendant knew that
possession of food stamps was unauthorized by the statute).
156 See, e.g., State v. Elton, 680 P.2d 727, 731 (Utah 1984) (allowing the defendant to
rely on a mistake of fact defense as to the victim's age under an unlawful sexual intercourse
statute). But see Braun v. State, 185 A.2d 905, 906 (Md. 1962) (representing the general
rule that mistake of fact is not a defense to bigamy).
157 See State v. Cude, 383 P.2d 399, 400 (Utah 1963) (finding that the owner of a car
subject to a merchant's lien had a defense to larceny, if the owner honestly believed he had
a right to possession). Also, reckless rather than knowing, mens rea will generally reduce
the gravity of the crime (for instance, from murder to involuntary manslaughter).
158 8 Eng. Rep. 718; 60 All E.R. 229 (H.L. 1843).
159 Id. at 722-23.
160 MORTON HORWrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw 1870-1960 51-53
(1992).
161 See, e.g., Michigan City v. Rudolph, 12 N.E.2d 970 (Ind. 1938) (driver presumed to
know that automobile will go out of control when driven fast through loose sand). See
Note, 23 MINN. L. REv. 628 (1934) (providing an exhaustive collection of cases on what the
reasonable person will know).
162 See C.AMARi & PERILLO, supra note 113, at 356-77 (misrepresentation); id. at 378-91
(mistake); id. at 323-31 (incapacity due to mental infirmity); id. at 305-26 (infancy).
165 Inability to reason due to youth or mental infirmity is not "ignorance," strictly
speaking, since ignorance implies a lack of information rather than an inability to use the
information through the exercise of reason. The law's recognition of a person's inability
to reason as a basis for exculpation in contract law and in criminal law creates a promising
point of departure from the traditional Aristotelian notion of ignorance.
164 Note, supra note 161 (providing an exhaustive compendium of situations involving
what the law presumes that people know).
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purposiveness to recklessness),165 or to negate intent altogether.166
Furthermore, while courts generally do not consider mental illness or
disability as defenses to intentional or negligent acts, they may lower
the standard of care for the mentally handicapped plaintiff in the case
of contributory negligence. 167 Finally, courts consider age when de-
termining the standard of care for child defendants in negligence
cases because of most children's inferior knowledge and ability to
reason.
168
It should be clear, even from this limited discussion, that the
traditional moral-psychological model of excuse in Anglo-American
law generally requires either that an, actor be compelled or that the
actor be justifiably ignorant of the nature of the act. Where the act is
compelled, the law assumes that it is not the person, strictly speaking,
who has performed the act; rather, some force outside the actor is
deemed legally responsible. Similarly, courts excuse the act done by
reason of ignorance because the person acted under a misapprehen-
sion of the circumstances and did not intend the result. In either
case, the act is involuntary and the actor is not liable for the
consequences.
Although these two excusing conditions seem omnipresent,
neither compulsion nor ignorance is actually involved in exploitation.
Persons may be deemed to have been exploited even when they have
acted voluntarily and with full information. The next section develops
the proposition that the concept of exploitation does not fit easily into
either the volitional or the cognitive category of excuse.
C. The Traditional Paradigm and the Concept of Exploitation
When talking about exploitation, some writers invoke terms such
as "coercion," "duress," and "overcoming of the will."169 Others speak
as if the cognitive capacities of the victim of exploitation have failed by
claiming that the choice offered is so enticing that the victim is unable
to adequately weigh the risks and benefits of the proffered alterna-
165 See RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 8A, illus. 2 (1964) (defendant's ignorance
that a particular consequence is substantially certain to follow will reduce the level of liabil-
ity from intent to recklessness).
166 See Garratt v. Dalley, 279 P.2d 1091 (Wash. 1955) (holding that there is no intent to
injure on the part of a five-year-old child if the defendant can prove that he did not know
that pulling a chair out from under someone who is about to sit down would cause the
person to fall).
167 See, e.g., Lynch v. Rosenthal, 396 S.W.2d 272, 277 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965) (adjusting
the standard of care in a contributory negligencd claim for a mentally handicapped
plaintiff).
168 See KEETON, supra note 110, at 179-82 (discussing children as defendants in negli-
gence actions).
169 See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
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tive.170 In this way, modem advocates of the theory of exploitation
seek to bring it under one or both of the traditional bases for exculpa-
tion.' 7 ' Yet, exploitation does not quite fit either category: the victim
of exploitation is neither compelled nor acting by reason of
ignorance.
Exploitation is distinguished from coercion or duress in that co-
ercion inevitably occurs in the context of a threat which serves to re-
duce the number of available options open to the actor. Exploitation,
however, characteristically involves a situation in which the actor is
presented with an offer that represents an additional alternative to the
choices previously available.' 7 2 Exploitation, then, is distinct from the
traditional notion of compulsion in two respects. First, the decision to
pursue the proffered choice is precisely that-a decision made by the
actor. Because it is a decision and not a compelled act, the choice
springs from internal motives and is not imposed by forces outside the
agent.'73 Second, an offer that creates an additional alternative can
never render an action less free or voluntary than the action which
would otherwise have been performed.174 That is, providing an addi-
tional choice is per se liberating, not compelling.
Nor does exploitation cause the victim to act by reason of igno-
rance. Although fraud may accompany exploitation, as in the case of
the quack doctor in the third scenario at the outset of this piece, ex-
ploitation may also occur even when the alleged victim has full knowl-
edge of the situation and the available options. If anything, the
allegation of exploitation depends upon a theory of incapacitation of
the rational process not recognized by the traditional Aristotelian
paradigm. 175
A number of theories and metaphors have surfaced in the litera-
ture on exploitation as commentators have attempted to bring the
concept under the traditional paradigm. 176 The next section of this
Article discusses some of these theories and metaphors, as well as the
manner in which exploitation operates.
170 See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
171 See supra part III.A.1.
172 Id.
173 However, it is difficult to determine what lies "inside" and "outside" the self, meta-
physically or psychologically. Dan-Cohen, supra note 150, at 982.
174 See infra part IIIA (discussing whether an offer can ever be coercive).
175 See infra notes 247-87 and accompanying text (discussing the subtle effects of emo-
tional disturbances on reasoning ability).
176 See supra notes 28-106 and accompanying text (discussing these theories of exploita-
tion in the context of surrogate parenting, organ sales, and non-therapeutic experimenta-
tion on prisoners).
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III
EXPLOITATION: VARIED THEORETICAL BASES
A. Exploitation as an Impediment to Free or Voluntary Acts
One way to bring exploitation under the traditional exculpatory
paradigm is to argue that the exploitative offer impairs the volitional
capacity of the actor. Commentators have suggested at least three dif-
ferent accounts of the way exploitative offers limit free choice.177
First, some claim that exploitative offers can be coercive. An examina-
tion of the distinction between exploitation and coercion will require
an investigation of the concept of "intrapsychic coercion."178 Second,
some maintain that attractive offers exploit by playing upon powerful
or even irresistible desires that the actor cannot disregard. 179 Ex-
treme enticement may result in a kind of "intrapsychic compulsion,"
as distinguished from intrapsychic coercion. 80 Finally, others main-
tain that certain bargains may exploit by taking advantage of an indi-
vidual's values and beliefs, which may themselves be the product of
social conditioning.' 8 '
The following sections consider various claims predicated upon
the notion that exploitative offers interfere with an individual's voli-
tional capacities, creating an obstacle to the exercise of free will. This
Article rejects those claims and argues that these offers represent an
obstacle to rationality. That is, exploitative offers interfere with practi-
cal reasoning, a necessary prerequisite to coherent decision-mak-
ing.'8 2 Before considering these issues, however, it is necessary to
address the distinction between exploitation and coercion.
1. Exploitation Versus Coercion
Exploitation must be distinguished from coercion.1 83 If exploita-
tive offers limit free or voluntary choice, they operate in a different
way than coercive threats. Exploitation characteristically involves an
offer of an additional alternative that the actor may voluntarily accept
177 See Feinberg, supra note 3, at 209 (discussing how exploitation may be coercive);
Virginia Held, Coercion and Coercive Offers, in COERCION 58 (J. Roland Pennock &John W.
Chapman eds., 1972) (exploitation by irresistible desire). See also CoREA, supra note 32, at
228 (exploitation by social conditioning).
178 See infra notes 201-05 and accompanying text.
179 See infra notes 206-17 and accompanying text.
180 See Held, supra note 177, at 57 (discussing coercion as the result of compelling
retroactive desires).
181 See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
182 See infra notes 240-87 and accompanying text (for a discussion of how these
processes interfere with the process of reasoning).
183 See Feinberg, supra note 3, at 202 ("To determine whether A has coerced B, we look
to the effects of his conduct on B's options. The expected effect on A's own interests (his
profits or gain) is relevant only to the further and particularly independent question of
exploitation."); WERTHEIMER, supra note 4, at 226.
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or reject without sanction.' 84 Coercion, on the other hand, has been
defined as requiring three individually necessary and jointly sufficient
conditions. 8 5 First, the coerced act must be voluntary in that the ac-
tor could have chosen to act differently.'8 6 A person who performs
some act which the person would not otherwise perform because
there is a gun at the person's head is, nonetheless, acting voluntarily
according to this definition: the person could have refused to per-
form that act, albeit with fearsome consequences.18 7 Second, coer-
cion always takes place in the context of an interpersonal
relationship. 8 8 Neither natural nor physical conditions can coerce.
Finally, and most importantly, coercion must involve the threat of
harm, never the promise of benefit. 89
The most significant implication of this definition of coercion is
that an offer is per se non-coercive. This has been the subject of con-
siderable academic debate, but a slight majority adhere to the view
that an offer can never be coercive.' 90 An offer of benefits can never
be coercive in this sense for two related reasons. First, offers are free-
dom-enhancing insofar as they always open up additional alternatives,
while threats serve to restrict the previously existing alternatives. For
example, a pedestrian walking down the street with a wallet full of
money may either retain the wallet or present it to the first stranger
encountered. However, if the stranger forces the pedestrian to yield
the wallet at gunpoint, the first option is effectively foreclosed. Rob-
bery, of course, is a paradigm instance of coercion.
A second reason why numerous philosophers have maintained
that an offer can never be coercive is that coercion necessarily involves
a threat of punishment for noncompliance, rather than a promise of a
benefit for compliance. 191 For example, Bayles maintains that to call
184 WERTHEIMER, supra note 4, at 205-11, 226-27.
185 Michael Bayles, A Concept of Coercion, in COERCION, supra note 177, at 17.
186 Id. at 18.
187 Id.
188 Id. at 19-20.
189 Id. at 22-23.
190 Those who argue that an offer cannot be coercive include the following: Bayles,
supra note 185, at 22-23; Bernard Gert, Coercion and Freedom, in COERCION, supra note 177,
at 30, 32-35; NozicK, supra note 5, at 262-65; WERTHEIMER, supra note 4, at 225-32. But see
JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONAIrIY 82-83
(1988); Held, supra note 177, at 57; HAROLD D. LAsswELL & ABRAHAM KAPLAN, POWER AND
SOCIETY. A FRAMEwoRK FOR POLITICAL INQUIRY 97 (1963).
These writers are only representative of the debate. The issue as to whether induce-
ments are coercive is fundamental to liberal political ideology. For the classical liberal or
libertarian, there can be no exploitation. See, e.g., NozIcK, supra note 5, at 262-65. The
term carries no pejorative import because the classical liberal system is predicated upon
free exchange by autonomous, self-interested individuals. Full disclosure and absence of
duress signify the absence of exploitation.
191 See, e.g., WERTHEIMER, supra note 4, at 310 (arguing that coercion requires that the
offeror's threat or proposal must leave the offeree no real alternative, and that this propo-
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an offer coercive is to confuse the notions of bribery and coercion 1 92
Thus, the distinction between coercion and exploitation is basically
the difference between causing someone to have to make a difficult
choice ("your money or your life") and taking advantage of the existing
situation. 93 That is, coercion worsens the actor's situation. An offer,
on the other hand, can be rejected without making the offeree's situa-
tion any worse than it was ex ante.
Those who argue that offers may be coercive, and for whom the
concepts of exploitation and coercion overlap considerably, reject
both of these arguments. 194 They maintain that, at least in some
cases, an offer may either limit freedom or leave a person in a worse
position than before it was made.195 Those who argue that an offer is
capable of limiting freedom maintain that it does so by presenting the
offeree with an irresistible alternative: the offer is, in the sense of tak-
ing advantage of an overpowering desire, "coercive." 96 This reliance
on this alternative definition of coercion demonstrates the equivocal
uses of the term. 97 Because this concept of coercion has more to do
with enticement than with duress, Part III considers this use of the
term "coercive."198
Others argue that an offer may be coercive (in the first and more
ordinary sense of the term) insofar as some offers do indeed leave the
offeree in a worsened position relative to the pre-offer situation. For
example, Feinberg refers to offers like the one in the lecherous mil-
lionaire example at the outset of this Article as freedom enhancing
sal or threat must be wrongful). But these two conditions must be "moralized." See id. at
307-10. See also Bayles, supra note 185, at 22-23 (stating that coercion involves a threat of
punishment).
192 Bayles, supra note 185, at 22-23.
193 Feinberg, supra note 183, at 208-09.
194 See ELsrR, supra note 190; Held, supra note 177; LASSWELL & KAPLAN, supra note
190.
195 See Feinberg, supra note 3 (exploitative offers sometimes leave victim in worse posi-
tion); Held, supra note 177, at 58 (limiting freedom by introducing an irresistible desire).
196 See, e.g., Held, supra note 177, at 57 (who argues that offers "coerce" to the extent
they cannot be resisted).
197 Held's argument that offers can be coercive amounts to the claim that particularly
attractive inducements may make it difficult for a person to refuse. "[A] s an inducement to
accept an offer approaches a high level, it approaches coercion proportioriately." Id. The
problem with this view is twofold. First, it suggests that actions which are motivated by
desires can be the product of coercion. Indeed, the greater the desire, the greater the
coerciveness of the offer. Second, it confuses coercion with involuntariness. The argu-
ment is that the offer is coercive because the offeree "could not resist." Even if this assess-
ment is true, the offeree's inability to resist does not make the decision coerced. The
coerced act must not simply be irresistible, but must also be against one's will. It is difficult
to see how an act performed out of intense desire could be against one's will.
Note that Bayle's view of coercion requires that the act be voluntary. See Bayles, supra
note 185, at 17. In contrast, Held's view appears to equate coercion with an involuntary or
irresistible act. Held, supra note 177, at 58.
198 See infra notes 206-18 and accompanying text.
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coercive offers. 199 He argues that an offer may coerce by foisting an
"unacceptable" consequence upon the offeree who rejects the offer.
If the young woman in the lecherous millionaire example rejects the
millionaire's offer, she not only faces the prospect of her child's
death, which is the same consequence she confronted before the of-
fer, but she might also experience significantly greater guilt than she
would have had the offer never been made. After all, she presumably
could have saved the child by accepting the offer. In this view, the
lecherous millionaire's offer is exploitative to the extent that he seeks
a bargaining advantage by capitalizing on the young woman's aware-
ness of her potential guilt. At the same time, the offer is coercive to
the extent that rejection may leave the woman in a worse position
than before it was made. The problem with considering such situa-
tions coercive, however, is that the putatively coercive stimuli come
from within. Is guilt or fear of self-inflicted intrapsychic punishment
truly coercive? The next section focuses on this question.
2. Intrapsychic Coercion
As noted, although an offeree may indeed be in a worse position
after the presentation of an offer, it is not due to an external condi-
tion. In the event the young woman rejects the millionaire's proposal,
she is not in a worse position because of some external threat, but
because of the intrapsychic effects of her knowledge of the offer itself.
Thus, the lecherous millionaire example is not coercion in the usual
sense; if anything, it is an instance of "intrapsychic coercion." The
actor is coerced into accepting an offer by the threat of internal self-
punishment in the form of guilt, fear, despair, or self- recrimination.
It might be argued that there are good reasons for rejecting in-
trapsychic coercion as an exculpatory condition. First, as previously
argued, coercion has traditionally encompassed only situations where
the threat is external. 200 There may be sound policy reasons for the
law's traditional refusal to account for internal psychological conflicts
and problems that result in certain forms of behavior.201 Second,
problems of proof and fraud have always slowed the law's acceptance
199 Feinberg, supra note 177, at 208-09.
200 See supra notes 183-99.
201 In tort law, for example, there is no insanity defense. See, e.g., McGuire v. Almy, 8
N.E.2d 760, 763 (Mass. 1937) (insanity no defense to intentional tort). Intrapsychic coer-
cion is probably substantially less debilitating than insanity. Thus, even though incapacity
may be a defense to enforcement of a contract, the level of mental handicap must be
demonstrably severe. Incapacity by virtue of insanity, for example, requires that the person
not understand the nature and consequences of the act at the time of the transaction. See
Cundick v. Broadbent, 383 F.2d 157, 160 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 948 (1968).
Other grounds of mental incapacity are senility, mental retardation, delirium, and intoxi-
cation. CALAI & PERILLO, supra note 113, at 324. Mere internal conflict or cognitive
dissonance, on the other hand, will not be sufficient. Id.
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of such intrapsychic considerations, such as tort law's rejection of the
insanity defense to intentional or negligent torts. 20 2
Notwithstanding these considerations, however, intrapsychic co-
ercion should indeed represent one important excusing condition
where it results from an offer. While such offers are not coercive in
the traditional sense, cases of intrapsychic coercion can be the basis
for exploitation. This Article argues that these offers have been mis-
characterized as essentially volitional constraints when they actually
represent obstacles to rationality by interfering with a person's capacity
for practical reasoning.20 3 This Article contends that negative intra-
psychic consequences, such as guilt or fear of self-loathing, interfere
with the decision-making process not by compelling an otherwise un-
desirable action, but by skewing the subtle emotional and cognitive
foundation upon which attitudes, beliefs, judgments and goals are
built.20 4 That is, some offers are exploitative not because they weaken
the will but because they prevent clear thinking about the actor's op-
tions. Technically, this condition is not self-imposed. Where an of-
feror seeks to take advantage of a foreseeable, if not ubiquitous,
human weakness, the offeree should be permitted a defense to the
agreement.205 Intrapsychic coercion thus represents one way in which
offers may be exploitative.
3. Exploitation as Enticement: Intrapsychic Compulsion
In contrast to intrapsychic coercion, in which the actor is com-
pelled to act in fear of the consequences of refusal, intrapsychic com-
pulsion characterizes situations in which actors are motivated by
exploitatively attractive offers. Although internal motivation is pres-
ent in both cases, intrapsychic coercion motivates negatively by threat-
ening psychological consequences, while intrapsychic compulsion
motivates positively by mobilizing irresistible desire.206
Even though there is no negative sanction to refusal, some writers
persist in considering enticement a form of coercion.20 7 For example,
Held argues that "as an inducement to accept an offer approaches a
high level, it approaches coercion proportionately."20 8 Similarly, both
202 See McGuire, 8 N.E.2d at 762-63.
203 See infra part III.
204 See infra notes 247-87 and accompanying text.
205 Although a rational impairment alone will not suffice, where this impairment is
accompanied by an intention on the part of the offeror to take advantage of the offeree,
the basis for exploitation is present. See infra part IV.B.2.
206 The distinction between positive motivation by desire and negative motivation by
fear or guilt may not always be clear. For example, aversion is a desire to avoid a negative
sanction. Conversely, desire for a positive reward may spring from fear of not attaining the
desired object.
207 See, e.g., Held, supra note 177, at 57.
208 Id.
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Haskar and Elster suggest that offers may coerce by manipulating a
person's predominantly unconscious intrapsychic processes, taking
advantage of a putatively "irresistible" desire to accept the offer.209
This Article argues that intrapsychic compulsion can and should
be distinguished from true coercion. Nevertheless, intrapsychic com-
pulsion's appeal to intense desires constitutes yet another type of im-
pediment to the process of practical reasoning.21 0 Seduction is
perhaps the archetypal example: it requires genuine opposition to
the sexual encounter and action contrary to the victim's most funda-
mental values.21' To consider seduction, enticement and other forms
of intrapsychic compulsion simply "weakness of the will" is mislead-
ing.2 1 2 It is not so much that the will is overborne by desire as it is that
a person's entire "evaluational" system213 is temporarily and dramati-
cally altered as it is filtered through the lens of a particularly compel-
ling desire. From the standpoint of the purported victim, the
situation is experienced as a shifting of values resulting in a sometimes
radically different perspective on the situation.21 4 This is fundamen-
tally a cognitive, and not a volitional, failing.
But how irresistible must an offer be before it is considered truly
compelling in the relevant sense? In terms of an obstacle to rational-
ity, what level of reward or promise of satisfaction is necessary before
the law should recognize that the actor's capacity to reason effectively
has been substantially impaired?
From the volitional perspective, few conditions are absolutely ir-
resistible in some ultimate physical sense.215 Although there may be
209 See Vinit Haksar, Coercive Proposals, 4 PoLrmcA THEORY 65, 68 (1976); EISrER, supra
note 190, at 82-83.
210 See infra notes 263-71 and accompanying text.
211 Seduction requires that the seducer "win over" the victim, "corrupting" the princi-
ples of the seduced. WEBsrER'S COLLEGE DicTIONARY (3d ed. 1991). The victim may be
overcome with desire that contravenes other fundamental values of the victim.
212 From Aristotle onward, this has been the prevailing moral-psychological framework
by which seduction, bribery and other forms of enticement are explained. See ARISTOT=E,
supra note 137 and accompanying text. Aristotle refutes the Platonic view that all evil re-
sults from a state of ignorance-that no actor does evil knowingly. Id. He argues that
incontinence is a form of weakness of will. Id. at 1039-49. This Article's view is not a
reversion to the Platonic view. Rather, it follows modem psychology in holding that "will"
and "reason" are not so easily distinguished. See infra part III.B.2 (discussing the support-
ing evidence).
213 See Gary Watson, Free Agency, LXXIIJ. PHIL. 205 (1975). Watson argues that an act
is free if it springs from motives (desires) that conform with the individual's evaluational
system. Thus, the heroin addict is not free even though a desire for heroin motivates the
addict's behavior. Id. at 217.
214 See infra notes 247-87 and accompanying text.
215 As Feinberg argues, physical irresistibility is exemplified in situations when a per-
son jumps from a sinking ship in the middle of the ocean and swims for land until sheer
physical exhaustion takes its toll, or when a person hanging from a window ledge stories
above the ground loses his grip and plummets to the ground. Feinberg, supra note 120, at
282-83.
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sound normative reasons for drawing the line liberally in cases of du-
ress, 216 it is unlikely that situations similar to the three practices dis-
cussed in this Article would meet the requisite level of irresistability.
The woman who enters a surrogate agreement, the seller of an organ,
or the prospective human test subject would presumably have consid-
erable difficulty demonstrating psychological irresistibility. Where
they are excusable, these cases provide legitimate bases for exculpa-
tion not because they are characterized by a volitional failing, but
rather because they present circumstances of interference with the
ability to reason objectively. Thus, the question is not: "Was the moti-
vating desire irresistible?" Rather, the issue is whether the offer in-
voked desires that skewed the evaluational processes of the actor. 217
4. Social Conditioning and the Problem of the Authentic Self
Some commentators find exploitation in situations in which the
purported victim's actions may be explained in terms of social condi-
tioning.218 As noted, some feminists maintain that women are victims
of a form of social and cultural conditioning that emphasizes their
role as sex objects, procreators or nurturers.2 19 If social conditions
predispose women to want to have babies, the origin of these desires
renders the surrogacy decision questionable. Similarly, where individ-
uals act from environmentally conditioned predispositions in making
certain decisions, the choice to sell an organ may be challenged as
being the result of exploitation.
Intrapsychic coercion and compulsion involve internal motiva-
tion that is presumably so intense that it influences the actor's ability
to reason effectively and creates conflict between competing values,
beliefs, and desires. 220 In contrast, social conditioning functions in a
distinct psychological manner. While radical behaviorist psychologists
such as B.F. Skinner claim that mental states such as desires, beliefs,
intentions, and values are illusory constructs of a pre-scientific psy-
chology,22 1 others argue that social conditioning operates by setting in
place the array of mental states subsumed in the term "character."222
216 Duress does not typically encompass physical irresistibility. Rather, the victim must
make a difficult choice. Although the law excuses actions under duress, the act is not
involuntary because the actor could refuse to comply with the demand. Bayles, supra note
185, at 18.
217 See Watson, supra note 213.
218 See supra notes 39-46 and accompanying text.
219 See, e.g., CoREA, supra note 32.
220 See supra notes 201-17 and accompanying text.
221 B.F. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY 1-23 (1971).
222 Some commentators view discussion of "character" as unscientific because charac-
ter cannot be observed; only behavior can be observed. See, e.g., id. (discussing a radical
empiricist psychology). Nevertheless, philosophers and psychologists have increasingly
moved beyond the theoretical and practical limitations of logical positivism to reembrace
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If the values and behavior of women, the poor, and other traditionally
alienated groups have been socially conditioned by environmental
contingencies established by the dominant group, then their consent
is, in an important sense, superficial.2 23
The counter-argument, of course, is that, if social conditioning
vitiates free and consensual action, then everyone is unfree insofar as
all behavior is the product of each individual's own psychological his-
tory, itself a function of the totality of the individual's interaction with
the external world. From the volitional standpoint, to the extent that
anyone acts from desire, even where that desire is itself a product of
innate biological factors and social conditioning, that act must be
"free" in the only sense that accurately reflects the meaning of the
term "freedom."224 Conversely, how can a person's action ever be un-
free, as it is claimed to be by proponents of the charge of exploitation,
when it is motivated by her own desires, beliefs or values? The prob-
lem stems from viewing social conditioning as a form of volitional im-
pairment-an obstacle to freedom-rather than as an impediment to
the development of mature rationality. If social conditions determine
all behavior, the surrogate is no less free in wishing to bear a child for
another than is the corporate raider in engineering another take-over,
or the artist in creating another masterpiece.
What may distinguish these situations, however, is the way in
which conditioning shapes the decision-making capacity. Condition-
ing may either serve as a beneficial tool facilitating self-discovery, or
the question of character. See Robert H. Frank, A Theory of Moral Sentiments, in DECISION
MAKING: ALTERNATIVES TO RATIONAL CHOICE MODELS 158 (Mary Zey ed., 1992) (describing
the development of moral character).
223 True consent requires the freedom to consider other options, to choose one alter-
native and to disregard others. To the extent social conditioning precludes this weighing
of options, it renders choices superficially consensual.
224 In general, western philosophy has embodied two diametrically opposed positions
on the relationship between freedom and desire. One school of thought, represented by
the nineteenth century German idealist Schopenhauer, argues that we are unfree to the
extent that our actions are motivated by desires. Wright Neely, Freedom and Desire, 88 PHIL.
Rxv. 32, 36-37 (1974). Desires, which are viewed as external to the intrinsic self, may force
us to act in ways contrary to our own self-interest. As such, this line of thought follows the
Buddhist notion that true freedom comes with the negation of all desire. Id.
The more prevalent view among Anglo-American thinkers, on the other hand, follows
Hobbes in holding that freedom is nothing but the satisfaction of desire. One is free only
to the extent that one "gets what one wants."
There are problems with both theories, when taken to the extreme. If the law
adopted the Schopenhauerian view that every decision motivated by desire is unfree, per-
haps all decisions would be excused, insofar as they are products of desire. On the other
hand, if the Hobbesian account of freedom is correct, then even the victim of duress is free
insofar as he desires to escape the coercive threat by compliance. Freedom here is simply
the quotient of M/W, where M= the means to get what one wants and W= a person's wants
or desires. Freedom, therefore, can be maximized by either increasing the means at the
actor's disposal or by reducing what the actor wants. On this account, death would be the
ultimate state of freedom.
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function as a destructive means of indoctrination precluding self-de-
velopment and leaving the actor's network of beliefs, values, goals and
desires immature or dysfunctional. 225 Whether or not this is consid-
ered an impediment to rationality will depend upon the definition of
rationality.226
5. Is Exploitation An Impediment to Freedom of the Will?
Proponents of the theory of exploitation attempt to bring ex-
ploitation within the traditional exculpatory paradigm by applying ex-
ploitation to concepts ranging from coercion (internal or external) to
intrapsychic compulsion to social conditioning.227 Thus, they argue,
in effect, that exploitation renders the resulting decision or behavior
unfree. While pre-analytic intuition indicates that there is indeed
something debilitating about the kinds of situations which are some-
times thought to be exploitative, there are at least three difficulties in
concluding that exploitative offers disable the will, or the capacity for
free choice.
First, in all three situations, the behavior springs from internal
causes: psychologically aversive conditions, as in intrapsychic coer-
cion;22 8 powerful desires, as in the case of intrapsychic compulsion;229
or the socially-conditioned network of mental states.230 A long philo-
sophical tradition, including the position held by soft determinists, 23 '
suggests that freedom is contrary to external constraint: when behavior
springs from internal motivations, whatever the source or ultimate in-
225 "A person may design a better way of raising children primarily to escape from
children who do not behave well. He may solve his problem, for example, by being a
martinet. His new method may promote the good of the children or of parents in gen-
eral." SKINNaR, supra note 221, at 150. See id. at 138-73 (for a general discussion of the
different values which may motivate and underlie social conditioning and the "design of
culture").
226 If rationality is subjective, requiring merely coherence between an individual's be-
liefs, thoughts, desires, goals, and judgments, then, as long as the decision makes sense
from the standpoint of the limited goals and values of the subject, the decision would be
rational. If, however, rationality requires satisfying some objective or external goal-for
example, maximizing self-interest-then the decisions which result from conditioning may
well not be rational. See infra notes 313-17 and accompanying text.
227 See supra notes 28-106 and accompanying text.
228 See supra notes 201-05 and accompanying text.
229 See supra notes 206-17 and accompanying text.
230 See supra notes 218-26 and accompanying text.
231 Soft determinism reconciles its acceptance of determinism with the possibility of
freedom by distinguishing internal and external causation. All behaviors are causally de-
termined. Those behaviors resulting from internal causes such as desires, goals, and be-
liefs, are free. See generally Determinism, in 2 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 359 (Paul
Edwards ed., 1967) (discussing the soft determinism of Hobbes, Hume, and Mill). Hard
determinists respond by asking what sense it makes to call an action free when the actor's
desires, values and beliefs are predetermined. SeeJohn Hospers, Free Will and Psychoanaly-
sis, in REASON AND REsPoNsBILry 354 (Joel Feinberg ed., 1978).
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fluence of such internal motivating factors, it is to be considered
free.232
Second, in addition to the fact that the victim of exploitation acts
from internal motives, a line-drawing problem arises. When is a
mental impulse so powerful as to be considered irresistible, thereby
rendering the resulting behavior unfree? Although drawing lines is
not an insurmountable obstacle, very few desires or impulses are irre-
sistible in an ultimate sense. To the extent that certain desires, which
are considered irresistible, but are in fact quite resistible, albeit with
unpleasant consequences, 233 the term "freedom" loses some of its psy-
chologically or morally descriptive import. Freedom ceases to de-
scribe the subjective psychological or moral experience of the actor
and becomes a function of an externally imposed normative standard.
Once an act is considered "unfree" because as a policy matter we
think it should be excused, rather than the other way around, (i.e., an
act is excused if it is not free), then why even employ the term "free"
anymore? It would be easier and intellectually more honest simply to
promulgate standards of behavior and exculpating exceptions, dis-
pensing with the metaphysical issues of freedom and responsibility.
A third problem concerns intrapsychic compulsion and social
conditioning. Even if internally aversive conditions render behavior
unfree in some morally relevant sense, how can behavior motivated by
desires, values or goals ever be unfree?
There is a long tradition in Anglo-American philosophy that
equates freedom with the ability to get what one desires.23 4 If this is
what "freedom" means, then behavior resulting from intrapsychic
compulsion is free. In fact, the overpowering nature of the desire
only serves to enhance the value of freedom because the actor is getting
that which she intensely desires. Similarly, behavior that results from
desires stemming from social conditioning must be considered free.
Because intrapsychic coercion and compulsion and social condition-
ing cannot be shown to be freedom-limiting, it is important to ex-
amine why these influences are so troubling.
Psychological conflict may be a significant factor in intrapsychic
coercion and compulsion. Intrapsychic coercion may involve motiva-
tions in contravention of the individual's other values, beliefs and
desires. Thus, the woman in the lecherous millionaire example may
feel compelled by guilt to accept the offer, but she may also feel that
232 See generally DAVID HUME, AN INQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 90-111
(Charles W. Hendel ed., 1955) (1748) (freedom is opposed to external constraint, not
necessity).
233 As noted earlier, even a man with a gun to his head can resist the threat. Thus, acts
committed under duress are not involuntary, strictly speaking. See supra note 187 and ac-
companying text.
234 This is the Hobbesian tradition discussed in Neely, supra note 224, at 36-37.
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accepting the offer would be morally wrong, and perhaps even psy-
chologically destructive of her character.235 Fear, guilt and other aver-
sive emotions often motivate behavior. These aversive emotions are
psychologically constraining, however, only when they conflict with
equally powerful mental states and dispositions of character.2 36
Intrapsychic compulsion operates similarly. The individual may
intensely desire something, such as an addictive drug, and simultane-
ously recoil from it. What makes such situations tragic is not that the
desire is not satisfied, but that the desires themselves fluctuate such
that the satisfaction of one desire may entail the frustration of an-
other.23 7 The problem is not one of freedom, but of psychological
integration.238
Social conditioning presents the inverse problem. If the condi-
tioning has been particularly successful, the actor may feel no conflict
between various goals, values and desires. The conditioning may thus
prevent the individual from entertaining any options other than the
conditioned ones. In essence, conditioning may serve to short-circuit
the creative process by which the psychologically actualized individual
constructs and integrates herself.23 9 As a result, the potential person
who might have been, if the process of social conditioning had not inter-
vened to preclude this process of self-creation, is lost. Thus, even if it
is true that everyone is socially conditioned in every aspect of behav-
ior, some conditioning may facilitate the process of self-development
while other forms may hinder the same process. The problem is not a
lack of freedom, but is instead a function of the impoverished psycho-
logical conditions from which the values, goals and desires of the ac-
tor spring. Instead of metaphysical and moral questions concerning
the freedom of the individual, social conditioning raises questions
about the psychological, emotional and intellectual predicates for be-
235 See Frank, supra note 222, at 181 (arguing that certain behaviors may permanently
alter the actor's character by making it difficult to maintain the previous morally superior
disposition). For example, acts of dishonesty do more than affect the person's present
moral status: they make it emotionally more difficult to maintain a disposition of honesty
in the future. The actor's entire self-image may be detrimentally changed by a particular
act of dishonesty or immorality. Id.
236 Thus, the problem of freedom appears to involve not just getting what one wants,
but harmonizing all of one's various desires. It is not simply a problem of satisfaction, but
of psychological integration, coherence among one's various desires, values, and judg-
ments. See Watson, supra note 213; Harry G. Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of
A Person, LXVIIIJ. PHIL. 5 (1971).
237 This makes the case of addiction compelling and difficult to analyze in terms of the
usual association of freedom with desire.
238 See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
239 Conditioning may pose personality conflicts or establish a limiting network of val-
ues, goals and self-assessments. See ERICH FROMM, ESCAPE FROM FREEDOM (1941). Fromm
argues that character and culture are inter-dependent, and that certain cultures routinely
create certain kinds of character structure among those within the culture. Id. at 304-27.
Thus, certain cultures may create undeveloped selves, psychologically speaking.
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havior. The status of the behavior as voluntary or involuntary is not
important. Rather, what is important is whether the psychological
conditions under which the behavior originated are conducive to ef-
fective decision-making.
B. Exploitation as An Impairment of The Rational Capacity
1. The Role of Reason in The Traditional Exculpatory Paradigm
The traditional exculpatory paradigm excuses cognitive impair-
ments when the excused party is justifiably unaware of necessary infor-
mation, as with the contract defenses of fraud or mistake. 240
Furthermore, a number of contract and criminal law defenses excuse
on the basis of cognitive incapacity resulting from age, mental illness
or mental handicap. 241 These latter defenses are not instances of ig-
norance, strictly speaking because ignorance requires a lack of infor-
mation. Rather, some systemic cognitive incapacity prevents the
individual from knowing how to use this information.242
A failure of the capacity to reason, however, may lead to a state of
ignorance with respect to certain facts such that the actor cannot be
said to know what he is doing.243 In other words, impairment of one's
cognitive capacity may render the individual ignorant of the nature of
the act, its probable consequences or its moral permissibility. For this
reason, the traditional paradigm does recognize an excuse for cogni-
tive incapacity in some cases.244 In sum, although defects per se in the
process of reasoning are not excused, there is an excuse when such
defects are likely to result in ignorance of significant facts about the
nature of the individual's act or the circumstances in which the act is
performed.
Modem psychology, however, has discerned more subtle ways in
which the reasoning process can be influenced.245 The effects of such
influences upon human behavior are far-reaching.246 They do not
preclude knowledge of some external fact, but instead, serve to slant
judgments in equally debilitating ways.
240 See CAmAm & PERiLLo, supra note 113, at 355-78 (misrepresentation) and 378-92
(mistake).
241 Id. at 304-33 (discussing various forms of incapacity as a defense to contract en-
forcement). See also supra note 162 and accompanying text (discussing incapacity, among
other defenses).
242 Thus, mental disease or handicap may prevent one from reasoning properly, even
though the affected party may have all the requisite information.
243 Insanity differs from ignorance, yet insanity may lead to ignorance regarding the
nature or consequences of the action.
244 For example, incapacity due to youth is not recognized. See supra note 162 and
accompanying text.
245 See infra notes 247-87 for an overview of some of the ways in which this may occur.
246 See infra notes 247-87 and accompanying text.
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2. Modem Perspectives on The Interrelationship Between Reason and
Emotion
Beginning with the works of Plato, Western philosophy has distin-
guished two distinct aspects of human nature: what might be vari-
ously described as will and reason, the appetitive and the rational or,
to use the terminology of modern psychology, the volitional and the
cognitive aspects of human nature.2 47 While philosophers offer di-
verse theories concerning the nature and interrelationship of these
two aspects of human personality,248 they generally uphold the validity
of the conceptual distinction.2 49 Even where there is disagreement
concerning the relative priority of will and reason, as exemplified by
the contrasting views of Plato, who believed that reason was capable of
providing direction concerning ultimate ends, and Hume, who ar-
gued that reason has only an instrumental capacity (i.e., that reason
was a slave to the passions), the conceptual distinction between these
two disparate aspects of human nature has gone unchallenged.2 50
Although some conceptual advantage in distinguishing between
will and reason may remain,251 modern psychology has rejected the
view that reason is functionally independent of will.252 If will includes
all the various sources of motivation (instincts, needs, desires, appe-
247 Plato's philosophy emphasizes this distinction between will and reason, making
reason the dominant element of the soul. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, reprinted in GREAT DIA-
LOGUES OF PLATO (W.H.D. Rouse ed., 1956). See Terry Penner, Thought and Desire in Plato,
in PLATO: A COLLECTION OF CRITICAL ESSAYS, 96, 103-08 (Gregory Vastos ed., 1971) (ana-
lyzing Plato's description of the soul).
248 According to Hume, reason can never give us knowledge of ultimate ends but has
only an instrumental role in telling us how to achieve what we already value. Thus, reason
is a slave to the passions. DAVID HUmE, A TREATISE OF HuAN NATURE (Pall S. Ardal ed.,
1972) (bk. II). See Watson, supra note 213, at 207 (discussing the Platonic and Humean
views of reason).
249 This is evident in the fact that will and reason continue to be discussed separately.
See generally 2 WILLiAm JAmas, THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY (1890).
250 See generally id. at 325-71 (discussion of reasoning); id. at 486-592 (examination of
will or volition). As already noted, Plato, for example, suggested that reason provides ulti-
mate ends, while Hume argued that reason has only an instrumental capacity as slave to
the passion. See supra notes 247-48. Thus, the substantive distinction between the rational
dimension of the personality, on one hand, and the volitional or appetitive aspects, on the
other, remains throughout western philosophy. It is only with modem psychology that the
functional independence of the two is challenged. See infra notes 251-87.
251 For example, even if radical behaviorist psychology is accurate in claiming that
mental constructs such as will, reason, desire and values, etc. are merely old-fashioned ways
of describing neural-physiological processes in the brain, the terms may still serve to delin-
eate different types of processes which would otherwise be more difficult to describe.
252 The various approaches of modem psychology concur. First, Freudian psychoana-
lytic theory classifies reason as a function of the ego, which itself emerged from the id, the
unconscious repository of instinctual energy. Reason is clearly the pawn of unconscious
psychodynamic energies. SIGMUND FREUD, THE EGo AND THE ID 36-39 (James Strachey ed.
& trans., 1961). In behaviorist psychology, reason and will are both abstract reifications for
the process by which certain behavior takes place. It is not that reason and will are inter-
dependent, but that reason and will do not exist as such. See SiuqNER, supra note 221.
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tite, etc.) while reason includes the human capacities that relate to
knowledge (thoughts, beliefs, perceptions, etc.), then some mental
states do not fall neatly into either category.2 53 More importantly, psy-
chologists have concluded that reason is not functionally
autonomous.2 5
4
There are a number of philosophical problems with the concept
of rationality. For example, it is difficult to define reason and ration-
ality. Is reason substantive and result-oriented, or is it procedural in
nature?255 Is rationality or irrationality more basic, in the sense that
one is defined by reference to the other?256 Is rationality objective
and determinate or may parallel rational processes result in contrary
outcomes? Is reason universal and determinate or does it vary from
culture to culture, a product of social consensus? 257 These recurrent
issues fall beyond the scope of this Article. This section addresses only
the question as to whether volitional mental states-for example,
emotions, desires, and needs-affect the process of reasoning.
The concept of reason as an autonomous force in human action
reached its zenith in the writings of Immanuel Kant.2 58 Kant argued
that human action could only be truly autonomous when it was per-
formed according to the dictates of reason unfettered by "heterono-
Finally, modem cognitive psychology has focused upon the empirical demonstration of the
cognitive and the volitional interrelationship. See infra notes 263-77.
258 For example, are moods more essentially cognitive or volitional? Are values, goals
and purposes a function of the appetitive will or of reason?
254 See infra notes 261-63.
255 Neoclassical economics is the only social scientific theory that continues to define
rationality substantively. The rational decision maximizes one's subjective utility. Modem
psychology, sociology and other economic theories favor a procedural definition: the pri-
mary consideration is whether the process of decisionmaking is rational. As Zey states:
Economists use the term irrationality (nonrational) very broadly to des-
ignate any behavior that cannot be construed to fit the rational choice mod-
els. Also, they use the term rationality very narrowly to exclude action based
on emotion, habit, and values. The neoclassical model defines choice as
rational if the outcome is rational All behavior that does not produce the
rational outcome is irrational. In the other social sciences, the conceptual-
ization of decision making is rational because of the process it employs.
Mary Zey, Criticisms of Rational Choice Models, in DECISION MAKING 15 (Mary Zey ed., 1992)
(citations omitted).
256 See Bernard Gert, Rationality, Human Nature and Lists, 100 ETmICS 279, 280-81
(1990) (irrationality is basic); B.C. Postow, Gert's Definition of Irrationality, 102 ETHICS 103,
105-06 (1992) (irrationality is not basic).
257 See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRuCruRE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962) (claiming
that scientific revolution is as much a matter of changing social consensus as an inevitable
rational development of science); HAROLD I. BROWN, RATIONALTY 113-33 (1988) (provid-
ing an epistemological defense of the view that rationality inevitably involves social judg-
ments and changing social consensus). These views, of course, are radically opposed to the
traditional view that rationality is objective and determinate, that different cultures should
come to similar outcomes given the rationality of both processes.
258 IMMANUEL KANT, CRITQUE OF PURE REASON (F. Max Mfiller trans., 2d ed. 1907).
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mous" influences such as desires and inclinations. 259 According to
Kant, reason must be free from the bondage of will in order for the
person to attain genuine autonomy.260 This vision of unencumbered
reason may remain a goal of human behavior (an issue which contin-
ues to trouble neoclassical economic theory),26' but modem psychol-
ogy suggests that such autonomy is seldom if ever attained.262
In addition to the inherent constraints of limited attention, inac-
curate perception, faulty memory and imprecise calculation to which
cognition is subject,263 factors outside the cognitive sphere may also
affect reason. Disturbances on the volitional side of human nature
often serve to disrupt the process of reasoning. These volitional dis-
turbances encompass various mental states, including overpowering
desires; extreme emotional states, such as grief, fear, anxiety or ha-
tred; and a range of affective states, including depression, exhilara-
tion, and feelings of confidence. Such volitional states may adversely
affect rational decision-making in three ways: they may affect our be-
liefs, our values and the process of reasoning itself.
First, volitional states may affect the actor's beliefs. For example,
intense desires may have easily discernible influences upon an individ-
ual's beliefs which, in turn, will affect the capacity for rational judg-
ment. This is exemplified by situations where a person wants
something so badly that the person's beliefs and judgments concern-
ing the feasibility of obtaining it may be skewed. 264 At the extreme is
the drowning man who grasps at the proverbial floating straw to keep
himself above water. A rational, unthreatened individual would give
this solution no chance of success, but the drowning man's effort to
259 Id. at 511-15.
260 Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, in ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY 49-
62 (James W. Ellington trans., 1983). Thus, no action has true moral value unless it springs
from pure rationality. For Kant, even positive emotions such as sympathy and compassion
are heteronomous. Actions which spring from such emotions have a lesser moral value
than actions generated by reason alone. Id. at 54-55.
261 Psychologists and philosophers generally agree that rational choice theory (RCT),
under which persons are presumed to seek to maximize their own self-interest, is inaccu-
rate as a descriptive or scientific matter. Nevertheless, some argue that RCT adequately
describes how people should act, even if it does not explain how they do act. See R.J. Herrn-
stein, Rational Choice Theory: Necessary but Not Sufficient 45 Am. PSYCHOLOGIST 356, 356-58
(1990) (defending RCT as a normative theory).
262 Id. at 358-65.
263 JOHN S. CARROLL & ERIC J. JOHNSON, DECISION RESEARCH: A FIELD GUIDE 25-29
(1990) (discussing research on limits of cognition).
264 See MJ. Power, A Prime Time for Emotion: Cognitive Vulnerability and the Emotional
Disorders, in 2 LINES OF THINKING: REFLECrIONS ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THOUGHT 157 (K.J.
Gilhooly et al. eds., 1990) [hereinafter LINES OF THINKING] (stating that during episodes of
depression or stress, people's beliefs become more negative); Ole R. Hosti, Theories of Crisis
Decisionmaking, in DIPLOMACY. NEW APPROACHES IN HISTORY, THEORY AND POLICY 99-136
(Paul Gordon Lauren ed., 1979) (finding that decision processes are seriously disrupted
during periods of high stress).
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grasp the straw indicates a change in his beliefs, at least insofar as he
holds out some possibility that this may save him. More common are
situations in which desperate people seek unlikely solutions for their
troubles, such as the otherwise rational man in the third scenario who
takes his dying son to a quack doctor. Similarly, the desire to believe
in something may affect one's evaluation of the evidence for its
truth.265 Whether the proposition is the truth of some scientific the-
ory26 6 or the existence of God, an individual's subjective desire that it
be true will have an impact upon his assessment of the evidence con-
firming or disconfirming its truth.
In a similar way, extreme affective states, such as moods, influ-
ence beliefs, perceptions and judgments. Studies have demonstrated
scientifically what even the most mildly of introspective individuals al-
ready knows-that people adopt more negative beliefs concerning
themselves or the world during depressive episodes.267 As they re-
cover, they revert to more positive beliefs. 268 This is so even when
these beliefs are unrelated to their emotional states.26 9 For example,
a person who is depressed because she has lost ajob may adopt more
negative beliefs concerning the prospect of solving the deficit or
cleaning up the environment, even though these issues have little to
do with the individual's personal employment prospects. 27 0 Thus,
"[t]here is clear evidence that judgments are biased by emotional
state [s] ."271
Proponents of the functionally autonomous view of reason gener-
ally employ a psychological model in which beliefs, as a function of
our cognitive capacity, are derived solely from objective, external facts
about the world.2 72 Beliefs are viewed to be the intellectual residue of
perceptions and judgments about the world as it is.273 In fact, how-
ever, it is not just the external world that influences our beliefs; what
individuals would like to believe has at least as compelling an influ-
265 See JAMES, supra note 249, at 307-11 (discussing the influence of emotions on
belief).
266 A theory's proponents tend to evaluate supportive evidence favorably. See KUHN,
supra note 257, at 77-81.
267 See Power, supra note 264, at 157-64; IRvING L.JANts & LEON MANN, DECISION MAK-
ING 264-65 (1977) (discussing a study of elderly nursing home patients finding that feelings
of loss of choice may have debilitating, even lethal, effects); Hosti, supra note 264, at 104-
125.
268 Id.
269 Id.
270 SeeJANIs & MANN, supra note 267, at 243-77.
271 Fraser N. Watts, Emotion and Thinking, in I-NES OF THINKING, supra note 264, at 118.
272 This is the underlying tenet of classical empiricist philosophy. See HUME, supra
note 248, at 226-231 (for the seminal discussion of this view).
273 Id. at 258. For a discussion of the empiricist epistemology of Hume, see Stephen
Priest, The British Empiricists 134-37 (1990) (all knowledge comes from experience). See also
id. at 185-87 (providing a similar discussion of Mill's empiricism).
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ence on the structure of their beliefs. Similarly, beliefs and judgments
often vary with the individual's overall affective state. To the extent
that the individual's desires may be manipulated or moods exploited,
so too, may corresponding judgments be altered.
Second, intense volitional propensities, including overwhelming
emotional states, desires, and affective states, affect an individual's val-
ues. For instance, an individual may devalue the importance of a task
if convinced that it cannot be completed successfully. A more tragic
instance occurs when life circumstances compel a person to engage in
behavior that is inconsistent with previously existing values-for exam-
ple, a morally upstanding woman who is forced to steal to survive will
devalue the importance of honesty.274 One study examined the ca-
reer choices of graduating college males during the Vietnam war and
found a strong correspondence between survey respondents' opinions
concerning the importance of careers in theology, teaching and
medicine and the probability of their being drafted.275 (Draft exemp-
tions were permitted for those entering divinity school, teaching pro-
grams and medical school.) 27 6 The study suggests that a desire to
avoid the draft affected individuals' values concerning career possibili-
ties. Individuals tend to integrate values with behavioral dispositions
in order to reduce intrapsychic conflict or cognitive dissonance. 277
Fluctuations in emotional states similarly affect values. For exam-
ple, even though rage has traditionally been described as a (voli-
tional) failure of individuals to control their emotions,278 the
phenomenology of the experience may include the subjective, even if
momentary, devaluation of nonviolent values. During periods of ex-
treme anger, one may feel as if such values somehow do not matter so
much.27 9 Indeed, values appear to vacillate with differing states of
274 See Frank, supra note 222, at 181 (discussing the psychological basis for this
response).
275 JANIs & MANN, supra note 267, at 252-53.
276 Id.
277 Id.
278 One is said to "lose one's temper" or to be "overborne by passion." This volitional
language signifies a loss of control justifying reducing the severity of a crime for acts com-
mitted in the heat of passion. See generally Alec Samuels, Excusable Loss of Self-Control in
Homicide, 34 MOD. L. REv. 163 (1971) (discussing the circumstances under which the ex-
cuse is permitted).
279 I arrive at this claim by introspection. I would invite the reader to undertake a
similar self-investigation upon the next encounter with an anger-producing stimulus. The
point here is that the feeling of anger is experienced less as an overcoming of static values
by emotion but rather, as a deflation of these values themselves.
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mind, whether these changes are pharmacologically induced 28 0 or are
the result of more normal changes in the subject's emotional state.281
Thus, the traditional moral-psychological model in which reason
is functionally independent of will, holds that a person's basic hierar-
chy of values is relatively fixed. According to the traditional model, a
failure to act in accordance with those values stems from a weakness of
will rather than from changes in the underlying values themselves.282
As this section has shown, however, decisions and actions vary with an
individual's value scheme, and that value scheme varies with the indi-
vidual's moods, emotions and other mental dispositions. Thus, one
person may, by offer or threat, adversely influence the decision of an-
other by manipulating or taking advantage of these mental states.
Third, emotional disturbances may disorganize the very process
of reasoning itself.283 Studies have indicated that persons in emer-
gency situations typically act ineffectively. 284 Even when the individ-
ual's momentary values are clear, for example, to escape a life-
threatening situation, and the individual's beliefs about the means to
achieve the goal are rational, the individual's mental state may ham-
per organized reasoning to guide action. Thus, even from an internal
point of view, behavior may be ineffective and irrational.285
In at least these three ways-by modifying beliefs, by distorting
values, and by interfering with the cognitive organization of reason-
ing-strong emotional and affective states may impede sound reason-
ing. This Article proposes that exploitation is the knowing
manipulation of these processes. Intrapsychic coercion, compulsion
and some forms of social conditioning are emotionally and cognitively
destabilizing influences that may impair the ability of the actor to rea-
son effectively. There may be other types of impediments to the ra-
tional process characteristic of exploitation, but these are the three
280 See Frances E. Vaughan, Perception and Knowledge: Reflections on Psychological and Spir-
itual Leaining in the Psychedelic Experien in PSYCHEDEIC REFLEarIONS 108, 108-11 (Lester
Grinspoon &James B. Bakalar eds., 1983) (discussing the effects of LSD use on changes in
religious values).
281 Fatigue, stress and other routine experiences may also change values. See Power,
supra note 264, at 157-64 (effect of depression); Hosti, supra note 264, at 90-139 (effect of
stress).
282 See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
283 See, e.g., Keith Oatley, Do Emotional States Produce Irrational Thinking?, in LNES OF
THINKING, supra note 264, at 121-31 (suggesting that strong emotions cause a disorganiza-
tion in thinking patterns).
284 Id.
285 See id. (suggesting that thought patterns are disrupted in emergency situations).
One evolution-based theory suggests that emotions have aided survival because they inter-
rupt the patterns of normal thought processes and focus the actor on the threatening
situation. Id. In some cases, this over-focussing can be counterproductive.
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most frequently implicated in the literature. 28 6 These influences do
not, however, fall under the traditional exculpatory paradigm. Ex-
ploitative offers neither render the resulting behavior involuntary or
unfree, as these terms are used in the traditional paradigm, nor do
they impose barriers to the actor's knowledge of her situation, strictly
speaking. Yet the obviously debilitating effects of these processes
should excuse certain behavior, at least when another takes advantage
of these all-too-human frailties in the deliberative process.28 7
IV
A THEORY OF EXPLOITATION
A. Preliminary Issues
In addition to the problems already discussed concerning the vo-
litional and cognitive aspects of exploitation,288 a number of other
threshold questions are relevant to a definition of exploitation.
1. Exploitation and Dominance
Exploitation is sometimes viewed as a function of social disparity,
an endeavor on the offeror's part, to take advantage of a socially supe-
rior position.28 9 Marxists, feminists and others argue explicitly or im-
plicitly that a prerequisite of the exploitative relationship is that the
offending party possess some social advantage over the victim.2 90
This Article asserts that, although socioeconomic disparity is
often a predicate for exploitation, it is not a necessary condition. Ex-
ploitation merely requires the taking advantage of some vulnerability
of the other party. Ultimately, the victim of exploitation is psychologi-
cally vulnerable to the other party, but is not necessarily socially or
economically subordinate. For example, a young female student who
entices her college professor into a sexual relationship in exchange
for a better grade may be exploiting a weakness of the teacher despite
her inferior social position.2 91
2. The State of Mind of Victim and Perpetrator
What state of mind must the victim and the perpetrator of ex-
ploitation entertain, respectively, before an offer may be characterized
286 Manipulation of unconscious processes has not been discussed in the literature on
exploitation, but this would appear to be yet another means of exploitation.
287 See supra part IV.B.2.
288 See supra part III.
289 See supra notes 4-17 and accompanying text.
290 See supra notes 4-17 and accompanying text.
291 As already noted, seduction is not necessarily exploitation. Thus, the professor will
only be a victim of exploitation if the other requirements are fulfilled. See infra part IV.B.
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as exploitative? More specifically, must the perpetrator and the victim
be aware of the exploitation?
This Article suggests that exploitation does not require-indeed,
sometimes is altogether incompatible with-the victim's awareness of
the exploitative nature of the transaction. For example, the widow in
the first scenario may be altogether unaware of the advantage taken
by the studio. In some cases, a victim's learning of the exploitative
effect of an offer may itself vitiate the exploitative nature of the bar-
gain. For example, an offer may play upon an initially unconscious
mental process that can be controlled by the actor once it is made
conscious.292 In other cases, the victim may be well aware of the ex-
ploitative predicament. For example, in situations involving intra-
psychic compulsion or coercion, the victim may be all too cognizant of
her psychological vulnerability.293 Thus, the offeree's awareness of
the effects of the lecherous millionaire's offer may actually heighten
the exploitation.
Alternatively, exploitation requires that the offeror act purpose-
fully, knowingly or with reckless disregard for the vulnerability of the
offeree. Without this knowledge or intention, an immoral offer may
have the same debilitating effects upon the offeree's ability to reason
practically, but if the offeror does not intend to take advantage of a
vulnerability, the offer is not exploitative. 294
3. Exploitation and the Immorality of the Bargain
Is exploitation dependent upon the moral status of the object of
the bargain? Many putatively exploitative bargains involve a morally
questionable trade of a service or commodity: exploitation is rou-
tinely claimed in the context of prostitution, organ selling, surrogacy,
pornographic modeling and other presumably tainted activities. 295
But does the inherent moral taint render the agreement more likely
to be exploitative?
Imagine a woman of limited prospects who enters into a surro-
gacy contract for ten thousand dollars. If this same woman were to
take a job washing bathroom floors for the same effort at a similar
wage, would this also be exploitative? Although proponents of Marx-
ist and neo-Marxist theories of exploitation might well answer affirma-
292 This view of exploitation focuses on conscious mental states and processes. Ex-
ploitation may also utilize unconscious processes which skew the capacity for reasoning.
293 This is the case, for example, in the lecherous millionaire example. See supra note
3 and accompanying text.
294 See infra part IV.B and accompanying text.
295 See supra notes 40-52 and accompanying text.
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tively, others would disagree.296 For non-Marxist proponents of the
charge of exploitation, the allegedly dubious moral character of surro-
gacy itself distinguishes the situation of the surrogate from other bar-
gains under similar economic circumstances.
Some purport to disregard the moral issues, claiming that anyone
engaging in such activities cannot be acting from sound judgment.29 7
Yet, this merely replaces the charge of moral impropriety with a super-
ficially objective psychological assessment of the rationality of the bar-
gain.298 Minimally, it must be admitted that a portion of these
bargains may make sense from an economic and even an existential
standpoint. In these cases, proponents must either relinquish the
claim of exploitation or admit that it is sometimes a substitute for
moral condemnation.
By definition, every exploitative offer is immoral insofar as the
intention of the offeror is to take advantage of the offeree. But the
object of an exploitative offer need not be immoral. For example,
exchanging money for dance lessons, as in the first scenario, is not
intrinsically immoral, in contrast to exchanging money for sexual serv-
ices. Nor is every immoral offer necessarily exploitative. Baby-selling
is immoral because of its consequences for the baby, even if the par-
ties to the agreement are not exploited. In sum, tainted bargains are
immoral because they are exploitative; they are not exploitative be-
cause they are immoral.
4. Can Rational Agreements Ever Be Exploitative?
This Article suggests that exploitation, in the legally relevant
sense, requires that the victim make an irrational choice. Conversely,
rational choices can never be the product of legally recognizable ex-
ploitation. However, ordinary language often employs the concept of
exploitation to encompass situations in which the exploited victim
may nevertheless have acted rationally.
Claims of exploitation of the poor provide the best example of
this problem. In the scenario involving the Central American migrant
worker who agrees to work for very low wages in the United States, the
worker's bargain may ultimately .be rational because she can earn
296 For Marxists, all profit-taking is exploitative. See Crocker, supra note 5, at 201; Co-
hen, supra note 5, at 338. Classical liberals have a considerably more limited view of ex-
ploitation. Nozicm, supra note 5, at 262-65.
297 By claiming that involvement in the practice is irrational, opponents of these prac-
tices avoid the circularity inherent in saying that the particular practice is wrong because it
is exploitative, and that it is exploitative because it is morally wrong.
298 The language of moral judgment may be replaced by the language of modem psy-
chology. for instance, that the practice is not wrong, it is just irrational. But proponents
must explain why involvement is irrational. This is more difficult given modem psychol-
ogy's move away from a substantive, result-oriented conception of rationality.
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more here than in her homeland. It might be argued, however, that
the landowner is exploiting the migrant because the migrant receives
substantially less than market value and the landowner knows that the
migrant's options are limited. This appears to represent a paradig-
matic instance of exploitation.
Consider another, even more difficult, example. A man lost in
the desert stumbles upon some travelers who agree to provide him
with water and transportation to safely, an hour's drive from where he
is found; in return he agrees to pay $10,000. The man's desperate
decision is clearly rational; without this bargain he will die. Yet the
bargain appears immoral and exploitative precisely because the travel-
ers take advantage of his desperate circumstances and because their
profit is grossly disproportional to their burden. Given this scenario,
why should exploitation require an irrational choice?
This Article has primarily examined the allegation of inherent ex-
ploitation in broad classes of activities such as surrogate parenting or
organ sales. The migrant worker and man-in-the-desert examples, by
contrast, portray concrete instances of exploitation. Exploitation
functions differently in these two diverse contexts. In the case of
broad classes of activities, the charge of exploitation provides a gen-
eral argument against permitting the activity. For example, oppo-
nents of surrogacy urge state legislatures to prohibit all surrogate
arrangements prospectively because they are exploitative. Conversely,
individuals such as the migrant worker or the desert wanderer allege
exploitation retrospectively, after the arrangement has been carried
out. Here exploitation operates as a moral claim for additional com-
pensation or a contract defense.
In neither context should the law deem decisions that result from
rational choices exploitative. Two prevailing legal principles prevent
the law from recognizing this kind of defense to particular contractual
agreements. First, rational, fully informed, competent and noncom-
pelled decisions are considered legally binding.2 99 In the alleged
cases of rational exploitation, the decision is, by definition, neither
the product of irrationality nor compulsion. Neither the migrant's
nor the wanderer's decision is compelled in the relevant sense be-
cause the other party has not created their situation. Instead, the
other party has offered an option beyond those previously existing.
The second principle limiting judicial reconsideration of these
agreements is the general proscription against examining the ade-
quacy of consideration 30° For exploitation to function as a defense in
these cases, the courts would have to determine the relative values of
299 The doctrine of informed consent in tort law provides perhaps the most pointed
example of this. See, e.g., Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554 (Okla. 1979).
300 See e.g., Batsakis v. Demotsis, 226 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
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the goods or services exchanged. In such cases, courts would have to
find the bargained-for consideration so inadequate as to constitute ex-
ploitation.30 1 Thus, fundamental legal principles limit the law's giving
effect to our moral intuitions that the bargain is grossly unfair. In
short, although the moral concept of exploitation may include situa-
tions where the victim acts rationally, the legal concept of exploitation
cannot support such a broad definition.
Moreover, if some broad class of activities such as surrogacy is
perceived as exploitative without being irrational, the consequence of
prohibiting such agreements is even less palatable. For example, to
support the abolition of organ sales while simultaneously admitting
that the bargain may be rational from both the seller's and the buyer's
standpoints is to leave the term meaningless. Worse yet, to prohibit
such transactions under these circumstances serves only to prevent
prospective parties to such transactions from doing something they
wish to do and which it is rational for them to do. This is worse than
mere paternalism because the claim of exploitation would prohibit
parties from entering agreements that make sense for them to enter,
and that would presumably better their situations. Here, the case
against calling rational bargains "exploitative" is at its most
compelling.
Can rational agreements ever be exploitative? The answer is: yes
and no. While everyday moral language permits some rational agree-
ments to be deemed exploitative, such agreements should not be rec-
ognized in law as such. The underlying principles of our system of
excuse in general, and contract law in particular, prevent legal recog-
nition as "exploitative" of any particular agreements that are otherwise
rational. Moreover, to call a particular class of activities sui generis "ex-
ploitative" while maintaining that such bargains are nevertheless ra-
tional makes little sense, both linguistically and as a matter of public
policy.
B. Exploitation Defined
For a particular transaction to be exploitative in the legally rele-
vant sense, the following conditions must be met. The putatively ex-
ploitative proposal must:
1) consist of an offer of benefit, never a threat;
2) which is made intentionally, knowingly or recklessly on the
part of the offeror, such that it is likely to involve, implicate or take
advantage of;
301 See, e.g., Kugler v. Romain, 279 A.2d 640 (NJ. 1971) (excessive price, combined
with other factors, including misrepresentation, is exploitative).
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3) a psychologically recognized vulnerability or weakness on
the part of the offeree;
4) where the vulnerability or weakness characteristically results
in a significant impairment of the rational-emotional capacity of the
individual;
5) that the offer actually has the effect of impairing the ra-
tional-emotional capacity of the offeree;
6) such that, but for the impairment of this capacity, the of-
feree would not have accepted the offer.
1. Offers, Never Threats
As argued earlier, coercion typically involves a threat of harm in
the event the threatened party does not comply, while exploitation
involves an offer of some benefit which the offeree may, at least from
an external standpoint, refuse.30 2 The first condition does not re-
quire that the conferred benefit be objectively beneficial to the offeree.
Indeed, many offers are considered exploitative in part precisely be-
cause the offer of benefit is illusory. An offer to sell the offeree heroin
does not benefit the offeree in the sense that heroin is a good thing
for the user. Nor, in the case of seduction, is the seduced party
benefitted, particularly because seduction requires that the victim of
seduction act in contravention of his usual values. Rather, there is an
offer of benefit only in the sense that the offer holds out something
which the offeree subjectively desires or perceives to be a good thing
at some point in the process, even if the recipient may have a different
opinion at another time (as when the addict wishes to overcome the
addiction or the victim of seduction regrets succumbing).
2. The State of Mind Requirement
The second condition for exploitation goes to the state of mind
of the offeror; it requires that the offeror intend to take advantage of
some psychological weakness or vulnerability on the part of the of-
feree or that the offeror act in reckless disregard of the offeree's prob-
able condition. The intent element should function as it does with
intentional torts.3 03 Two elements must be met: first, the offeror
must act voluntarily30 4 and, second, the act must be performed with
302 See supra part IIIA.1 and accompanying text.
303 The intent element is met whenever the subject deliberately acts to bring about a
desired consequence. Intent is distinguished from negligence by this subjective require-
ment. When this subjective desire is absent, the consequence must be substantially certain
to occur. Negligence requires only that the subject act unreasonably. KEETON, supra note
110, at 33-39. The actor need not seek to cause harm of any kind. Id. at 36.
304 Voluntariness simply requires that some behavioral occurrence follow a mental
state which precipitates the behavior. Intent is voluntariness and substantial certainty of
the requisite consequence. Id. at 34-35.
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the desire to, or with substantial certainty that the act will in fact,
bring about some specific consequence.30 5 The standard for intent is
thus objective, not subjective.306 Including recklessness expands the
basis for liability of the offeror.30 7
But what is the specific consequence that the offeror must seek?
Must the offeror intend to gain some advantage or to do harm to the
offeree? Both of these questions must be answered in the negative.
Although gaining advantage or harming another may provide evi-
dence of the motive for the act, neither is necessary for
exploitation.308
In the case of exploitative offers, the offeror must act with the
desire or substantial certainty that the offer will implicate or take ad-
vantage of some vulnerability of the offeree that is likely to induce a
bad decision on her part. This is all that must be intended. The offer
need not create the cognitive impairment; it is sufficient that it take
advantage of a pre-existing condition. Thus, the offeror must subjec-
tively know, or there must be substantial certainty, given what the of-
feror knows or should know about the offeree's situation,30 9 that the
offer will undermine the rational capacities of the offeree. The of-
feror must, therefore, act in conscious disregard of the likelihood of
exploitation.
For example, in the lecherous millionaire example discussed
above, if the millionaire had made the proposal, "Be my mistress and
I'll give you one million dollars," without knowing about the young
woman's son, the offer would not have been exploitative.3 10 Indecent
proposals are not per se exploitative. Similarly, the quack doctor in the
third scenario meets the intentional element because of his awareness
of the father's vulnerable condition. In the same manner, the dance
studio in the first scenario does not exploit the widow simply by selling
her fifty years of dancing lessons (a bad deal, on the widow's part, not
only because it is highly unlikely that she will live long enough to en-
joy them, but also because she has to sell everything she owns to pay
for the lessons). Rather, the studio exploits her by playing on her
loneliness. It is because the agents of the dance studio know that she
305 Id. at 36.
306 Again, however, a subjective desire to bring about the consequence may be
enough, even where the actor could not be substantially certain, as an objective matter,
that the consequence would follow.
307 Recklessness requires that the consequence be highly likely, if not substantially cer-
tain, to follow.
308 Id. at 35.
309 Id. at 36.
310 However, the offer might be exploitative on other grounds. For example, it might
be per se exploitative if the offer of a million dollars set in motion some form of intra-
psychic compulsion.
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is not in a position to reason properly that they are taking advantage
of her.
Why is intention necessary? Exploitation could function as a
strict liability claim. Any offer that causes a substantial impairment of
the offeree's capacity to reason would be deemed exploitative. The
law, however, does not remedy every bad bargain. With the exception
of some contractual status defenses, such as infancy or incapacity,311
the law will not relieve a party of the burden of an agreement even
when it results from some substantial impairment of rational capaci-
ties. Acting impulsively, or from some internal conflict, or from some
overwhelming desire will not relieve that party of the burden of the
arrangement. Transactions only become exploitative when a party
knows about and attempts to take advantage of the plight of another.
Otherwise, neither a bad deal nor an immoral offer, nor the fact that
an individual's reasoning was impaired, will be sufficient to render the
arrangement exploitative.
In sum, while the offeror need not intend to wrong the offeree by
making the offer, the second condition is met when the offeror has
good reason to know about the condition of the offeree. This is what
makes exploitative offers morally wrong-the fact that the offeror
seeks to undermine or take advantage of the offeree's vulnerable
condition.
3. A Recognized Psychological Vulnerability
The third condition of exploitation requires that the offeror in-
tend to take advantage of some human weakness or vulnerability
which is recognized as such by modern psychology. "Vulnerability"
means a disposition of personality or circumstance of life that serves
to hamper the rational-emotive process, such as severe depression,
grief, guilt, fear or physiological addiction. A mere passing desire is
not sufficient. In the second scenario, the man who purchases a
Bruce Springsteen ticket at an exorbitant price from a ticket scalper is
not vulnerable within the meaning of this condition. On the other
hand, the widow in the first scenario and the father of the dying boy
in the third case almost certainly satisfy the condition.
Notwithstanding the relatively clear cases of vulnerability, how-
ever, this condition may be the most controversial of all. Does vulner-
ability include the effects of socioeconomic status as well as
emotionally traumatic conditions, intrapsychic coercion and compul-
sion? Is poverty, political oppression or social disenfranchisement suf-
311 See CLAMAPJ & PERILLO, supra note 113, at 304-33 (providing overview of these
defenses).
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ficient to constitute a vulnerability within the meaning of the third
condition?
Poverty and sociopolitical alienation certainly do result in deci-
sions that would not otherwise be made. How many persons of com-
fortable means offer to sell a kidney, even where the remuneration is
substantial? Differences in life choices, even those resulting from lim-
ited alternatives, however, do not inevitably imply a vulnerability. A
poor person's decisions may differ from a rich person's, and yet still
be rational given the life circumstances of the poor person.
Vulnerability is defined here as an internal psychological condi-
tion that typically or routinely causes an impairment in the rational-
emotive capacities of the actor. External conditions or circumstances,
whether temporary, as in the case of duress, or relatively more perma-
nent, as in the case of socioeconomic factors, may cause the internal
psychological condition, but the internal condition must nonetheless
be characterized by a recognized psychopathology. Psychologists
must agree that the trait or condition is a psychological factor that
tends to impair a person's ability to reason practically and
effectively.312
Poverty, political oppression or social alienation, then, constitute
a vulnerability or weakness within this definition only if being poor or
oppressed creates some internal psychological disability. Generally,
poverty will not constitute such a vulnerability because it usually does
not result in an internal psychological state recognized by modern
psychology to interfere with the process of reasoning. This condition
is met, however, when poverty results in a situation that physically
threatens the actor, such as starvation.
As with all empirical concepts, questions of line-drawing arise.
Not every psychological condition is severe enough to render the sub-
ject vulnerable. For example, imagine the following scenario: A
young woman begins to see a psychic because she wants some ques-
tions answered. Over the course of the next year and a half, she be-
comes increasingly involved with the psychic, invests more money and
psychological commitment in the process, ultimately spending
thousands of dollars before realizing that the process is a sham.
Although the relationship began as an amusement, or at worst the
312 Of course, psychologists may disagree about psychopathology, as evidenced by the
debate concerning whether homosexuality is a form of psychopathology. Gerald C.
Davison, Homosexuality: TheEthical Challenge, in TAKING SIDES: CLASHING VIEWS ON CONTRO-
VERSAU PSYCHOLOGICAL ISSUES 162 (Joseph Rubinstein & Brent D. Slife eds., 1980) [herein-
after TAKING SIDES] (homosexuality is normal); Irving Bieber, A Discussion of Homosexuality:
The Ethical Challenge, in TAKING SIDES 163 (homosexuality is a form of psychopathology).
For a trenchant discussion of the normative, aspects of psychiatric classification, see
THoMAs S. SzAsz, IAw, LMERT AND PSYCHIATRY 24-36 (1963) (suggesting that psychiatric
classification has more to do with public policy than with descriptive medicine).
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product of light-hearted credulity, it slowly develops into a more per-
nicious and parasitic practice.
At some point, when the motives and beliefs that underlie the
relationship become more serious and are characterized and
animated by fear, anxiety, dependence, or other rationally debilitating
conditions, the relationship becomes exploitative because the victim is
motivated by vulnerability. Drawing the line between what is and is
not a vulnerability, however, is no different from similar problems in
other areas. What is important is that vulnerability requires some-
thing more than mere credulity, gullibility, curiosity or naivet6.
4. Irrationality
The fourth condition requires that the vulnerability be of the va-
riety that typically impairs the rational-emotive process.
Part III addressed various theories concerning volitional and cog-
nitive impairment.313 I argued there that, although enticement, du-
ress and other constraining conditions are often described in terms of
some failure of the will, they are actually impediments to effective cog-
nitive functioning, even though these may result from perturbations
on the volitional side. As a psychological matter, the cognitive and
volitional aspects of personality are not so readily distinguishable as
traditional philosophy has regarded them.314 Emotional disturbances
may affect the capacity to reason practically in several ways, including
intrapsychic coercion and compulsion, and social conditioning. Their
influence skews the deliberative process.315 When the influence upon
the individual's judgment is substantial, such that the individual
would have decided otherwise in the absence of the debilitating psy-
chological state, this condition is satisfied.
The difficult issue is evaluating how a person might have acted
under other psychological circumstances and determining which solu-
tion "makes sense," as a rational matter, for the actor. Virtually any
decision may be "rational" from a subjective standpoint-that is, from
the standpoint of the actor's own beliefs, values and goals. For exam-
ple, the heroin addict who agrees to sell his soul for his next fix may
be acting rationally, on this account, if his desire for the drug is strong
enough.316 Rationality loses its prescriptive significance as it is relativ-
ized to the mindset of each particular actor.
313 See supra notes 177-287 and accompanying text.
314 See supra notes 247-87 and accompanying text.
315 See supra part IiA.
316 For example, self-destructive behavior may be rational if a person believes that life
is not worth living or that pain will outweigh pleasure in the remaining time. Even the
behavior of the insane can be rational if all beliefs are considered. If one really believes
that shooting oneself in the head will propel oneself into the tenth dimension, where life is
infinitely better than it is here on earth, shooting oneself must be recognized to be per-
688 [Vol. 79:631
EXPLOITATION
An objective evaluation of the rationality of decisions considers
whether a particular decision makes sense from the standpoint of an
individual's subjective beliefs, goals, values, and desires, and also
whether these beliefs, goals, values and desires are themselves rational.
Given the obvious practical difficulties of engaging in such a global
psychological analysis, this Article will follow tort law in proposing a
convenient, if ultimately disappointing, criterion for determining
whether a decision is rational: a particular decision will be deemed
"rational" if it would be made by a reasonable person in the subject's
circumstances. Failure to act in conformity with this standard permits
the conclusion that the deliberative process has been adversely af-
fected. Therefore, a person will be deemed to have made an irra-
tional choice with respect to a given set of circumstances when a
reasonable person in those circumstances would have chosen
otherwise. 317
5. Causation
There are two aspects to the causation analysis. The fifth condi-
tion requires that the offer constrain or impair the rational-emotive
processes of the actor in the particular case. Intention to exploit with-
out any actual effect is not sufficient. Exploitation requires that the
offer actually influence the victim. Finally, to meet the sixth condi-
tion, the cognitive impairment must function as the cause-in-fact of
the decision to accept the offer. An offer cannot be considered ex-
ploitative unless the actor would have decided or acted differently in
the absence of the cognitive impairment. Just as a threat is not coer-
cive unless it compels actions that differ from what the victim would
have otherwise done,318 an offer is not exploitative unless the victim
would have decided differently, but for the existing cognitive
impairment.
If the offeree acts rationally under the circumstances, there is no
exploitation because condition (4) above is not satisfied. On the
other hand, keep in mind that the offer need not cause the irrational
decision; the cognitive impairment must bring it about. It is sufficient
that the offeror should have known with a high degree of probability
of the offeree's cognitive impairment in making the offer. Thus, pro-
posals to mentally ill persons are exploitative because it is highly likely
fectly rational. Of course, the beliefs upon which this act are predicated may not be ra-
tional, but, again, this presupposes some objective standard of rationality by which to
measure these beliefs.
317 Informed consent determinations require the court to determine whether a rea-
sonable person in the plaintiff's shoes would have acted otherwise had full information
been available. See, e.g., Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554 (Okla. 1979) (setting forth a simi-
lar standard in the informal consent for determining context).
318 Bayles, supra note 185, at 19.
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that the resulting decisions will be irrational, even though the offer
itself is not the cause of the cognitive impairment.
Similarly, the offers of the dance hall studio or the lecherous mil-
lionaire are exploitative even if the respective offerees would have
done something equall irrational in the absence of the offer. For
example, even though the young mother in the lecherous millionaire
example would have sold herself into prostitution to save her daugh-
ter, the millionaire's proposal is still exploitative even though it
merely replaces one irrational decision with another. The million-
aire's offer is exploitative because it seeks to take advantage of the
woman's psychological vulnerability, even if that vulnerability would
have resulted in other, equally irrational decisions without the offer.
In the absence of the causal relationship between the impairment and
the decision, however, neither the millionaire's foul intent nor the
young woman's irrational decision suffice to render the transaction
exploitative.
Note, however, that the theory of exploitation propounded here
does not require that the offeree's position be worsened, subjectively
or objectively, as a result of the exploitative offer. Indeed, some ex-
ploitative offers may leave the party in a better position. For example,
if the lonely widow in the first scenario would ultimately have commit-
ted suicide but for the dance hail studio's exploitative proposal, the
offer was actually beneficial. Similarly, if the desperate mother in the
lecherous millionaire example had resolved to prostitute herself to
save her daughter, she is arguably in a better position than before the
offer. In both cases, the offer replaces one irrational decision (with
possibly tragic consequences) with another irrational decision (that
might have less onerous consequences).
The offers, however, are still exploitative notwithstanding the
beneficial results. The offeror may not defend her actions on the
ground that she bettered the offeree's situation. The offer ceases to
be exploitative only when it does not undermine the rational capaci-
ties of the offeree or take advantage of a pre-existing vulnerability.
V
APPLICATIONS
This theory of exploitation may now be applied to the three prac-
tices discussed in Part 1.319 This exercise should be helpful both in
demonstrating how the concept of exploitation is applied in actual
cases and in substantively analyzing the claims of exploitation in each
of these three contexts.
319 See supra notes 28-106 and accompanying text.
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In all three contexts-surrogate parenting arrangements, organ
sales from living donors and consensual, nontherapeutic medical ex-
perimentation on prisoners-we may assume that the first, second,
fifth and sixth conditions are met: First, we may assume that an offer
is made which the offeree is free to reject.3 20 Similarly, we will assume
that the second condition, which requires that the offeror act know-
ingly, intentionally or recklessly to take advantage of a perceived psy-
chological vulnerability on the offeree's part, is satisfied. Neither the
fifth nor the sixth condition need be discussed since they cannot be
assessed in the abstract. The fifth condition requires that the offeree
experience a cognitive impairment of the kind expected to follow
from psychological vulnerability. The sixth condition requires a
causal relationship between the cognitive impairment and the result-
ing decision. These determinations can only be made on an individu-
alized basis, and so the following analysis will assume that both
conditions are satisfied. Thus, we will discuss here whether the three
practices in question generally serve to take advantage of a vulnerabil-
ity which characteristically results in irrational choices.
A. Surrogate Parenting Arrangements
What social, economic and psychological conditions predispose a
woman to become a surrogate mother? More important for the pur-
poses of this Article, do these motivations satisfy the conditions for
exploitation?
While surrogate mothers come from diverse socioeconomic back-
grounds, a general composite of surrogate mothers emerges from one
survey. 321 Most surrogates are non-Hispanic, white, Protestants, in
their late twenties, who have earned a high school education.3 22
About one-third have college degrees and a small percentage has at-
tended graduate school.32 3 Most come from lower-middle and mid-
dle- class households with annual incomes between $15,000 and
$50,000 in 1987 dollars.324
What role does financial exigency play in the decision to become
a surrogate? One study found that roughly forty percent of all surro-
gate applicants were either unemployed or a recipient of financial
assistance. 325 Surrogates are generally paid between $10,000 and
320 If the situation is characterized by some form of coercion, then there is no offer at
all.
321 See OTA, supra note 28, at 269-73.
322 Id. at 273.
323 Id. at 273.
324 The OTA reported that 53% came from households earning $15,000 to $30,000 (in
1987 dollars) and 30% from households earning $30,000 to $50,000. Id.
325 CoRFA, supra note 32, at 229.
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$12,000.326 Nonmonetary factors also motivate women to become sur-
rogate mothers: many express an altruistic desire to give an infertile
couple a baby, or a wish to experience pregnancy without having to
raise the child.3 27 Others find themselves drawn to surrogacy after
working in "nurturing" fields such as health care and early childhood
education.3 28 There is little doubt, however, that financial incentives
are a necessary condition to the surrogate's involvement in the
arrangement.3 29
Nevertheless, this data does not substantiate the charge that sur-
rogates as a class are exploited. Economic incentive is not necessarily
evidence of a psychologically recognized vulnerability that results in
rational impairment. If it were, virtually all economic decisions would
be similarly tainted as the product of exploitation. Of course, in ex-
treme cases-situations of intrapsychic coercion in which financial ex-
igency reaches the point of genuine desperation-the conditions for
exploitation may exist. Generally, however, because payment is usu-
ally deferred until after the completion of pregnancy,330 surrogacy
does not provide a viable economic alternative for women with imme-
diate financial needs.
Nor is the payment for surrogacy so attractive that it approxi-
mates intrapsychic compulsion. While the value attached to a given
sum of money is relative to a person's particular circumstances,
$10,000 to $12,000 is not such an overwhelming amount that it be-
comes a compelling influence. The minimum wage employee work-
ing forty hours a week earns just under this amount annually.33 '
While surrogacy may offer some advantages over working a minimum
326 This is the figure posited by those in the surrogate industry. Mellown, supra note
41, at 237. See also OTA, supra note 28, at 275 ("the most common fee for a surrogate
mother is $10,000").
327 See Amy ZucaKRmAN OvERVOLD, SURROGATE PARENTING 119-27 (1988) (discussing
the various motives of women who become surrogates).
328 Id.
329 Even defenders of surrogacy admit that monetary considerations are important.
See, e.g., NOEL P. K & DENNis L. BPEo, THE SUPRROCArE MOTHER 49-50 (1981) (few
women would act as surrogates in absence of monetary renumeration). Aware that mone-
tary considerations may motivate surrogates, many clinics require applicants to be econom-
ically independent. OTA, supra note 28, at 273. Clinics have also devised procedural
protections, including cooling off periods to ensure against hasty decisions. This "cooling
off" period is also accomplished, as a practical matter, by the fact that the period before
artificial insemination results in pregnancy may be long. Even those in favor of enforce-
ment of the surrogate contract defend the right of the woman to change her mind before
conception occurs. See, e.g., Hill, In Defense of Surrogate Parenting Arrangements, supra note
30, at 367.
330 Alternatively, the surrogate may receive payment in installments. See Katie Marie
Brophy, A Surrogate Mother Contract To Bear A Chil, 20J. FAM. L 263 (1981-82) (discussing
terms of the surrogate contract, including payment).
331 A working earning $4.50 per hour, forty hours per week, fifty weeks per year would
earn $9,000 annually.
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wage job-including the opportunity to stay at home throughout
pregnancy-it also presents obvious physical disadvantages. Conse-
quently, surrogacy offers few advantages over a full-time minimum
wage job. Moreover, even if, hypothetically, the monetary benefits for
participation in a surrogate arrangement were double that for the
minimum wage job, such decisions would not necessarily be irrational.
If acceptance of every offer that doubles the offeree's annual income
were prima facie grounds for holding the acceptance of the offer irra-
tional, a large percentage of employment decisions (including those
made by most graduating law students) would be similarly voidable.
Thus, the financial rewards cannot be so compelling that they impede
the rational capacities of the woman in making her decision.
Nor does the claim of social conditioning afford a basis for the
charge of exploitation. First, the claim of ubiquitous social condition-
ing is simply overstated. If pervasive social conditioning is true, then
presumably all decisions made by women-or at least all such deci-
sions involving childbearing and rearing-are similarly tainted. If no
woman is demonstrably free in such matters, when is any decision an
expression of her true self?
Second, even if it could be established that all childbearing deci-
sions are the product of social conditioning, in what sense are these
distinct from other people's ordinary decisions? If behaviorist psy-
chologists are correct in contending that all behavior results from en-
vironmental conditioning,33 2 then no criterion distinguishes the
woman's decision to become a surrogate from any other decision.
Thus, even if the decision to become a surrogate stems from social
conditioning in some sense other than that from which all our deci-
sions derive, it is not clear how this represents a form of psychological
vulnerability that meets the requirements of condition three.
As noted earlier, however, there is a subtler dimension to the ar-
gument regarding conditioning: conditioning may either enhance or
stunt a person's potential course of self-development. Because en-
trenched social influences shape desires, intentions and values, wo-
men learn to perceive themselves primarily as procreators and
nurturers whose value and identity is affirmed by their biological ca-
pacity to procreate and their resulting role as primary caretakers.333
Consequently, this argument contends that women recognize their
limited options and seek out mothering roles.
Even if this argument accurately portrays the social influences
that lead some women to become surrogates, it lacks the compelling
332 See SKINNER, supra note 221, at 138-74 (arguing that cultures can be designed to
provide optimal reinforcement of socially beneficial behavior).
333 See generally CHODOROW, supra note 40 (providing a feminist account of this
process).
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force it once had in an earlier day. Few people believe that women of
this generation have been so completely conditioned that they are
helpless to choose alternative roles. Indeed, the relatively few women
who become surrogates33 4 and the increasing number who delay or
forego childbearing33 5 are ample evidence of the polyphonic influ-
ences upon women's values in contemporary society.
Even to the extent that claims of social conditioning are accurate,
however, this general conditioning does not constitute a kind of psy-
chological vulnerability recognized by modem psychology. While ex-
treme forms of social conditioning of the "clockwork orange" variety
may indeed produce the requisite form of vulnerability, common so-
cial conditioning generally does not.
Moreover, even if social conditioning produces the requisite vul-
nerability, it is not the kind of vulnerability which typically results in
irrational decision-making. It is well within the range of rational alter-
natives for some women to become surrogates. The fact that other
women would never deign to consider this alternative, or that some
might even find the practice morally repugnant, does not necessarily
entail that the decision to become a surrogate is irrational. Thus, so-
cial conditioning does not necessarily result in irrational choices, as
required to fulfill condition four.
It might be argued, however, that the decision to become a surro-
gate is fundamentally irrational or, at least, ill-advised and unin-
formed. A surrogate must relinquish a child she has borne, a
potentially psychologically devastating act. How can she foresee her
emotional response when the time comes to turn over the child? Do
surrogate contracts exploit this lack of knowledge on the part of
surrogates?
First, various legislative proposals provide numerous procedural
and substantive limitations on surrogate contracts, including appli-
cant screening, counseling and a requirement that the woman have
previously borne a child, in order to be able to anticipate their feel-
ings regarding relinquishment.33 6 While these safeguards never en-
sure against subsequent regrets,3 3 7 they mitigate the dangers
associated with uninformed or unself-conscious decisions.
Second, the few instances in which the surrogate has attempted
to retain custody of the child do not demonstrate that the initial deci-
sion was irrational. An individual's expectations and goals change,
334 Between 1980 and 1987, fewer than 25,000 women contacted surrogate agencies to
inquire about surrogating. See OvERVOLD, supra note 327, at 125, 162.
335 OTA, supra note 28, at 61-85 (for a discussion of factors contributing to rising rates
of infertility, including postponing childbearing until later years).
336 Hill, supra note 30, at 360-70.
337 For example, Mary Beth Whitehead, the surrogate in the Baby M case, had borne
two children previously. In the Matter of Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1237 (N.J. 1988).
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and there is always some risk that one may change one's mind about
an agreement. This does not render each such agreement the prod-
uct of exploitation. Nor does it render irrational the decision to enter
into the agreement, from the standpoint of the knowledge, goals and
intentions of the subject at the time of the initial bargain.
Finally, there is an element of uncertainty in all contracts. In this
respect, nothing distinguishes surrogate contracts from any other type
of agreement. Legislation can ameliorate the risks of uncertainty and
of hasty or ill-advised decisions, but some uncertainty will remain. Oc-
casionally-about one in one hundred cases 338 -women change their
minds and litigate the custody issue. But this is no more a reason for
condemning all surrogate contracts on grounds of irrationality and
exploitation than it is for prohibiting contracts in a variety of other
situations.
In sum, there is little compelling evidence for the claim that sur-
rogate arrangements are inherently exploitative. While there may be
other reasons for objecting to surrogate arrangements and while these
other reasons are sometimes confused with the notion of exploita-
tion,3 39 the claim of exploitation is generally unfounded in the con-
text of surrogacy. Surrogates are not subject to the requisite
psychological vulnerability nor are their decisions intrinsically irra-
tional. In rare cases women may be driven by economic exigency to
become surrogates; this, however, does not distinguish surrogacy from
other practices.
B. Voluntary Organ Sales
Voluntary organ sales present different social and economic con-
siderations relative to surrogate arrangements. First, the motive of the
seller is more clearly financial. While the surrogate usually knows the
intended parents340 and may want to assist them in their quest to have
a child,341 this familiarity and altruism is usually not the case with or-
gan sellers. A market in organs from living donors may be completely
anonymous.3 42 The potentially high price for organs makes it likely
that the monetary motive is the overriding consideration, although in
some instances the recipient may have a pre-existing relationship with
the donor.
338 Kasindorf, supra note 29, at 14.
339 For example, commodification must be distinguished from exploitation. The for-
mer involves the alienation of some personal capacity which should not be sold. See supra
notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
340 The surrogate often meets and interacts with the interested parents throughout
pregnancy. See OvERvoLD, supra note 327 (discussing experiences of surrogates and par-
ents in the process of interacting with each other.).
341 See supra notes 325-27 and accompanying text.
342 See supra notes 70-85 and accompanying text.
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Second, the great majority of those reported as willing to sell an
organ are citizens of developing countries. Surrogate mothers, by
comparison, are usually middle-class Americans.3 43 Thus, the socio-
economic disparity between seller and buyer may be much greater in
the case of organ sales.
Third, although pregnancy only rarely poses serious physical
problems,344 organ donation is arguably more dangerous. Risks in-
clude surgery,3 45 and the long-term physical effects and risks of having
a single kidney.3 46
It seems important, therefore, to understand the origin and the
intensity of the desire to sell an organ. The opportunity to earn per-
haps a million dollars for selling a kidney may motivate a poor Brazil-
ian with no viable economic prospects to do so. In extreme cases, this
may approach intrapsychic compulsion.
There may, however, be an inverse relationship between the fac-
tors relevant to condition three and those relevant to condition four.
As the amount of money offered increases, so does the likelihood that
an overwhelmingly attractive desire will motivate the sale. As mone-
tary consideration increases, however, there is also a proportionate in-
crease in the rationality of the decision, all other things being equal.
(Where risk increases in greater proportion than the offered amount,
this will not be true.) Thus, in cases of enticement, the likelihood of
fulfilling condition four increases as the prospect of satisfying condi-
tion three wanes.
This again raises the question regarding the criteria for measur-
ing rationality. As noted earlier, a decision is rational if it is one which
a reasonable person in the same circumstances would make.3 4 7 The
invocation of context adds a subjective element: the rational decision
is one that makes sense for a person in that person's circumstances.
Although it might be irrational for a middle-class American to ex-
change a kidney for a million dollars, it might be quite rational for an
impoverished South American with a large family to feed and few al-
ternative economic prospects to do the same. Indeed, from the stand-
point of health alone, the economic advantage to a very poor person
in obtaining adequate health care may more than compensate for the
risks inherent in relinquishing one kidney.
Consequently, although there may be times when the organ seller
is exploited in the moral sense-for instance, when the seller receives
343 See supra note 324 and accompanying text.
344 At least one surrogate has died during pregnancy. Kasindorf, supra note 29, at 13.
345 At least 16 people have died donating a kidney to a relative. Note, supra note 71, at
1033.
346 For example, what happens if the remaining kidney fails.
347 See supra part IV.B.
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a small sum of money for a kidney-organ sales cannot be collectively
condemned as exploitative. While other public policy arguments may
justify the ban on a market in organs,3 48 the claim of exploitation does
not.
C. Consensual Medical Experimentation on Prisoners
Consensual, non-therapeutic medical experimentation on prison-
ers presents still different concerns. Prisoners' motives vary from the
desire to participate in a good cause, as in the case of World War II
drug testing,3 49 to the desire to obtain increased amenities, additional
privileges, or higher pay.350
Is there something particular to prison confinement that makes
prisoners psychologically vulnerable? Of course, mentally ill or handi-
capped prisoners are potentially vulnerable, and present an obvious
opportunity for exploitation. To the extent that such individuals are
overrepresented in the prison population, this must be considered. It
is possible, however, to prohibit their involvement based on
incapacity.
Alternatively, it might be argued that the nature of confinement
itself may be so psychologically debilitating that all decisions made by
prisoners are suspect, i.e. that prisoners lack capacity generally. The
National Commission for Biomedical and Behavioral Research fo-
cused on this issue in recommending against most forms of prisoner
research.35 ' To be considered exploitative, however, this argument
assumes that modem prison conditions are so severe that they create a
state of physical deprivation or extreme psychological instability gen-
erally impairing the prisoner's ability to reason practically. This Arti-
cle suggests that such brutal prison conditions are unlikely, and that
348 See supra note 74 and accompanying text (listing these objections).
349 See Schroeder, supra note 86, at 971.
350 See Bailey v. Lally, 481 F. Supp. 203, 206-08 (D. Md. 1979) (describing inducements
to experiment participation including higher pay, interaction with non-prison personnel,
and improved living conditions. Favorable parole consideration was expressly forbidden).
If prison conditions should deteriorate below prevailing standards of human rights,
the prisoners would clearly be subject to coercion. Coercion, in contrast to exploitation,
deprives victims of something to which they are entitled. Wertheimer argues that coercion
includes consideration of a "moral baseline" for behavior. WERTHEIMER, supra note 4, at
204-22. The difference between threat and offer distinguishes coercion from exploitation.
The distinction is a function of whether the proponent is reducing or increasing the vic-
tim's options. Underlying the difference between a reduction and an increase in options is
the idea that deprivation of an entitlement constitutes coercion. Consequently, if prison
conditions fall below the morally acceptable standard and research participation results,
the situation is coercive.
351 National Commission, supra note 24, at 3076-79.
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as a result,35 2 the decisions of prisoners, as a class, cannot be consid-
ered irrational.
Another possible argument is that characteristic prison condi-
tions render prisoners more amenable than they might otherwise be
to the requests of their confiners. Perhaps prison life dampens an
inmate's usual self-interest. Under this scenario, the inmate simply
may not care. This would seem particularly likely for long-term or life
prisoners.3 53 Thus, while the prisoner is still capable of functioning in
a relatively normal manner, she does so with less regard for her own
well-being and with less interest in the future. Under such psychologi-
cal conditions, prison life may have a foreseeably detrimental or
debilitating influence on the prisoner's capacity to evaluate proposals
involving some risk.
Additionally, inducements offered in exchange for participation
may constitute intrapsychic compulsion. Favorable consideration at
parole time might well be overwhelmingly attractive and skew the pris-
oner's weighing of risks and benefits. It seems unlikely that other mi-
nor privileges or conveniences would have the same impact.
Certainly, it is easy to see the way in which a combination of the repug-
nance of prison conditions and the desire to be free might represent
such an appealing option that prisoners might be swayed in their con-
sideration of the inherent risks involved in the project. Of course,
prohibiting this type of incentive eliminates this objection.3 54
Thus, prison conditions present the best case for the claim of a
recognized psychological vulnerability from among the three prac-
tices discussed. Before the case for exploitation can be defended,
however, additional research concerning the psychological effects of
prison life is necessary. The most sound basis for the claim is that
prison confinement over long periods of time may cause a decline in
inmates' self-interest which results in their de-emphasizing the
projects' risks.
Nevertheless, are prisoners' decisions rational notwithstanding
the psychologically enervating influence of confinement? A reason-
able person faced with life imprisonment may appraise the prospects
of life in prison as less valuable than that of a life on the outside.
Under these circumstances, it might be rational to take certain risks to
improve those prospects. Thus, while a strong case can be made that
352 See generally MARK S. FLEisHER, WAREHOUSING VIOLENCE (1989) (for an anthropolog-
ical investigation of prisons). Id. at 131-55 (discussing day-to-day conditions of prison life.).
353 See, e.g., id. at 125-29 (the story of Thom, a long-term prisoner at a federal prison in
Lompoc, California).
354 See the current regulations on this matter for a practical approach. 45 C.F.R
§ 46.305 (a) (6) (1992) (forbids favorable parole decisions as inducement to participate).
[Vol. 79:631
EXPLOITATION
condition three is satisfied, it is uncertain whether condition four, re-
quiring an irrational choice, is met.
CONCLUSION
This Article has proposed a theory of exploitation as a psychologi-
cal or a cognitive concept: exploitation occurs only when the victim
acts irrationally under the circumstances at the time of the decision.
Legally recognizable exploitation requires an offer of benefit in-
tended to take advantage of a psychological vulnerability that impairs
the offeree's rational-emotive capacity. Although social and economic
considerations are relevant to the determination of rationality, ex-
ploitation is not fundamentally a social or economic construct.
Exploitation has long been a greatly overused and misused con-
cept, serving to fill the vague conceptual gap between the pre-analytic
intuition that there is something wrong with this bargain and the post-
analytic determination as to what this something wrong is, exactly. As
a result, exploitation has been confused with other concepts such as
coercion, commodification, and the harm done when a person takes
advantage of a dominant socio-economic position. The concept of ex-
ploitation has assumed the role of an omnibus moral catch-all cate-
gory, a term with as many meanings as those who use it, and which is,
precisely for this reason, a most mercurial charge to which to respond.
In concluding, it is important to note that the most fundainental
questions remain unanswered. In particular, what criteria should be
used to determine whether a particular decision is rational? The test
may have subjective elements: a decision is rational if it coheres with
the person's system of beliefs, values, and goals. It might also be de-
fined objectively: a rational decision maximizes the probability of
achieving a particular goal (for example, self-interest). If the test is
entirely subjective, virtually any decision is rational. On the other
hand, if the test is primarily objective, then must it also permit some
consideration of the individual's idiosyncratic values, goals, beliefs or
life circumstances? Most generally, is rationality fundamentally a sub-
stantive, result-oriented concept or a procedural, process-oriented
concept? This analysis has considered both aspects, focusing primar-
ily, however, on the substantive characterization of the offeree's deci-
sion in light of the impact of the offer on the reasoning process itself.
The common law avoids the issue, as this Article has, by contend-
ing that a decision is rational if it is one that a reasonable person
would make in that person's circumstances. If this test is fundamen-
tally unsatisfying-which it is, of course-it is, nevertheless, the closest
we have come to providing a solution to the problem of rationality.
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